been published before; others appear in English for the first time in this collection.

English and International Studies in the Literature, Art and Patronage of Medieval England (Cambridge), edited by Derek Pearse and Nicolete Zeeman, brings together a number of studies by Elizabeth Salter, some of them unpublished at the time of her death in 1980. Among the items of special interest to comparatists are the three unpublished essays of Part I, subtitled “An Obsession with the Continent,” and the last one, also unpublished, on “The Annunciation to the Shepherds in Later Medieval Art and Drama.”

This quarter has brought two new collections of letters of interest to readers of CL. Selected Letters of Eugene O’Neill (Yale), edited by Travis Bogard and Jackson R. Bryer, prints more than five hundred letters in chronological order, with notes and a brief introduction. Selected Letters of Stéphane Mallarmé (Chicago), edited and translated by Rosemary Lloyd, divides the letters into eight thematic groups and adds an introduction and notes.

Nietzsche’s New Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics and Politics, edited by Michael Allen Gillespie and Tracy B. Strong (Chicago) is a collection of essays, some original, some translations from French and German, on a variety of themes, but held together by an optimistic sense of a new world opened up by the acceptance of the nihilism that Nietzsche exposes and the new ways of thinking this imposes on us. As in a similar earlier collection, Why Nietzsche Now?, edited by Daniel O’Hara, the contributions may be broadly divided into those which expand on Heidegger and those which follow in the spirit of deconstruction.

MICHELE HANNOOSH

The Reflexive Function of Parody

A MAJOR ASPECT of parody to emerge from recent theoretical considerations of the genre is its essential reflexivity, its capacity to reflect critically back upon itself, not merely upon its target. This derives from its metalinguistic character, first emphasized by the Russian Formalists: the commentary of one text on another, or on literature generally, within a single work, exposing the methods and processes of art while it makes use of them. As parody deals specifically with works of art, its treatment of the parodied work may by analogy be generalized to include itself. Rose, for example, argues that parody possesses a self-reflexive aspect because of the dual function of the parodist as reader (of the parodied work) and author (of the parody): in presenting the parodist’s critical interpretation of his reading, it gives us a model by which to interpret itself.

Two important consequences, thus far unexplored, follow from this aspect of the theory and deserve to be considered in more detail. First, reflexivity is inherent in the definition of parody as a conical retelling and transformation of another text, and is demanded by the form itself. In altering a work according to a different, usually contemporary and/or trivialized code, parody challenges the notion of fixed works altogether.

1 E.g. M. Rose 97: “the problem of self-reference in metalanguage . . . have shown metalinguistic parody to imply criticism of itself, and a form of ‘self-parody’ in parodying other fiction.” See also R. Poirier 139: “[self-parody] . . . calls into question not any particular literary structure so much as the enterprise, the activity itself of creating any literary form.” Cf. L. Hutchinson 67: “overly imitating art more than life, parody self-consciously and self-critically points us to its own nature.” For works on reflexivity in general, see R. Alter, P. Waughs, and R. Siegle.


3 The parodied work may be a group of works, the manner associated with a school or movement, a genre, or any specialized language. For convenience, however, I shall refer to it here as a single work.

4 Cf. Rose 66 and 101.
and thus leaves itself open to the same playful or critical treatment. It provides a new version of an old story, but cannot legitimately propose itself as the definitive one, since by its own example it belies the concept of a definitive or authoritative work altogether. Moreover, a parody must even allow for a critique of itself such as it has performed on the original (or target, when these are different). This distinguishes parodic renewals from more generally intertextual ones, which are not obliged to make critical demands upon themselves in this way; the comic element present in parody, on the other hand, renders such self-criticism virtually compulsory.

Second, parodic reflexivity does not mean simply that the parody refers to itself as a text about texts, reflecting on itself by analogy, as it has been defined hitherto. It has more radical implications than mere self-reference: the parody actually rebounds upon itself, calling itself into question as it does the parodied work, and suggesting its own potential as a model or target, a work to be rewritten, transformed, even parodied in its turn. In particular, it frequently makes this possibility explicit in the text through a number of means, as we shall see shortly. Although reflexive devices and structures within individual parodies have been studied, the self-criticism which they imply has not figured in theories of the genre; nor have the means by which it is realized been identified. Self-criticism should be acknowledged as a central feature, however, for it is crucial to a thorough understanding of the genre, both in itself and as an agent in the evolution of literary forms as described by the Formalists. Moreover, it redeems parody from some largely unjustified charges, such as its destructive effect upon literary traditions, its poverty as a creative form, and its lack of self-consciousness. Parody implicates itself in its treatment of the parodied work, and often realizes this overtly.

Two critics have examined the matter of self-parody in particular. R. Poirier describes it as a distinctly modern form, which makes fun of itself by questioning the activity of literary creation in general, rather than a particular literary structure (349): the writer parodies the act of writing, as it were. He takes as examples Joyce, Nabokov, and especially Borges, all of whose parodies of the act of writing fiction are necessarily directed, by analogy, against their own enterprise as well. Poirier isolates modern parody on the basis of this feature, differentiating it from previous types by its attitude toward standards: the assumption in the "older kind" of parody that life, history, or reality has made certain literary styles outdated, as against the refusal of such standards by the "newly-developed" kind of self-parody. However, if, as I argue, the structure of parody as a comical reworking of another text implies in itself the possibility of self-parody, then the distinction is no longer valid. In the face of examples from the history of this highly self-conscious genre, the claim that "up to now parody has been almost entirely other-directed—by one writer against another or at the literary modes of a particular period" does not hold. But Poirier remarks, rightly and with insight, that in self-parody the "inferred standards" behind the parody are not allowed to become authoritative, and that self-parody does not merely question the validity of a text, but proposes "the unimpeded opportunity for making new ones" (352f).

In her study of parody as a metafictional form, M. Rose similarly argues for the self-critical implications of the genre but acknowledges their essential contradiction, the limits of self-reflexivity. A parody cannot take itself as its subject, cannot ultimately criticize itself fully: "the parodic and modernist metafiction has also shown itself to be forever short of its mark of analysing the reality of its own fiction" (81). Following this argument, self-parody is theoretically impossible, for it is forever unfinished and cannot describe itself completely: "cases of self-parody must imply further parody of themselves" (82f). Rose offers two solutions to this logical problem. First, self-parody is possible if it is defined as the parody of another of the parodist's works, although this does not address the reflexivity of the parody upon itself. Second, parody exposes the process of literary production of which it is an example, and thus implicitly includes itself in its criticism: this is the same analogical argument described earlier, which provides the theoretical foundation for reflexivity in the first place. Neither of these satisfies the requirement implicit in the genre, i.e. that the parodic action turn upon itself. But like Poirier, Rose acknowledges the "open ended" quality of parody and attributes to it an important function: "to show the process of

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1 The original may be the target of the parody's mockery, but need not be, and frequently is not. In such cases, the original is a vehicle for parodying or satirizing a different target, usually something contemporary. Iub Quiurus, for example, parodies the romances of chivalry (among other forms) in order to mock not the authentic ones like Amadis de Gaular but the spate of popular ones that followed them; the mock-epic may often does not mock the epic, but merely uses epic to make fun of something else, usually in the contemporary world. This idea has been expressed by a few critics, e.g. H. Markiewicz 263 and Hutcheon 44. Their claim that such mockery is satirical, however, does not follow from the theory. It may be parodistic, provided the conditions for this are met: the target must be a work or specialized language and must be the material of the parody. The original would thus be transformed according to the cliches of the target.

2 Bakhtin, however, considered self-criticism a feature of the novel, which at every stage in its history parodies the main type(s) and thus creates a new one. See Esthétique et thérature de roman 43f.

3 Cf. Hutcheon 10.

4 Poirier 349. Siegel makes this same objection concerning narrative reflexivity in general, e.g. "I have little sympathy for discussions that seem to confine reflexivity to recent avant-garde works, as if the novel had evolved into metafictional cleverness sometime during the 1960's" (14, cf. 3).
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literary creation to be unfinished and open for further development” (83; cf. 153). Its criticism of other works suggests that it may undergo a similar process in the future.

In fact, the openness noted by both of these critics ensures that parody fulfills the function attributed to it in Formalist theory, i.e., furthering the development of literary forms and guaranteeing the continuity of literary history. It destroys categorically the old charge leveled against parody, namely its destructive effect on both individual works and literature in general. In making the parodied work the basic material for itself, parody, in Formalist terms, actually regenerates a tradition whose procedures have become (or have the potential to become) mechanized, and thus contributes to the ongoing history of literature. As we shall see, however, parody accomplishes this not only by offering itself as the new product of the tradition that it revises, as is usually maintained, but also by actually suggesting other works within itself: providing for other versions of its own story or for future rewritings of itself. Parody mocks and transforms, undermines and renews (Rosen 61), thus putting its critical function ultimately in the service of literary creation and continuity. In rebounding upon itself, leaving room for other versions or even suggesting the forms these might take, parody ensures that the tradition it revises will continue even beyond itself.

The self-critical aspect of parody also proposes a response to one of the more damaging challenges made against the genre in modern criticism. Barthes classified parody as “l’ironie au travail” (52) and thus consigned it, along with irony, to the status of écriture classique, the antithesis of the multivalent écriture moderne: it proclaims itself a parody and thereby identifies its origins and paternity, the authority on which it uttersances are based, the voice which gives it unity. It prematurely arrests the literary play of codes, and its metalanguage, which we might expect to enrich this, instead merely superimposes one code on another. It thus performs an act of linguistic imperialism, placing itself as an authority over the parodied work: “L’écriture classique...s’assoufle vite, se ferme et signe très tôt son dernier code (par exemple en affichant...son ironie)” (145). In his view, only an ironie irony, such as he sees in Flaubert’s Bouvard et Pécuchet, has the capacity to keep the play of codes going by not privileging any one in particular, and by thus inspiring in the reader a “malaise salutaire” of undecidability (145). But the self-reflexive aspect of parody that I am describing may instead be seen actually to fulfill the function of writing as Barthes understands it: “annuler le pouvoir (l’intimidation) d’un langage sur un autre, dissoudre, à peine constitué, tout métalangage” (105). Parody may in fact be likened to the structure of his exemplary Bouvard et Pécuchet, “une circularité où personne (pas même l’auteur) n’a barre sur personne” (105), and may thus provide an answer to his rhetorical question: “comment épingler la bêtise sans se déclarer intelligent? Comment un code peut-il avoir barre sur un autre sans fermer abusivement le pluril des codes?” (212). Parody does not, indeed cannot, have the last word: its metalanguage proposes necessarily the existence of at least another, equally valid one, and thus undermines its power and status vis-à-vis the parodied work. The metalinguistic structure continues to exist, and is not “dissolved” as Barthes would wish, but its power is neutralized in the greater parodic scheme: the reader sees, with the extended vision offered by parody, that it is as vulnerable and tenuous as the parodied work itself.

The self-reflexivity of parody thus guarantees both a critical and a creative dimension to this form. The parody not only Rewrites another work, but suggests yet another one within itself, reminding the reader of the relativity of any work of art, and also of the richness of creative possibilities in an allegedly limited single source. This position provokes two qualifying remarks. First, it does not imply a necessarily conscious effort on the part of the parodist. Self-reflexivity is included in the conception of parody as a comical rewriting, and the logic of the genre as such; it therefore takes its place as an essential feature of parody which may legitimately inform our reading. Second, although it is implicated in all parody, it is not always actualized. This should not in any way diminish its status, however, for a single generic feature need not occur in every example. This one is particularly radical, the critical implications of the form carried to its furthest extreme, questioning the value and validity even of what the parody seems to endorse.

As examples from various periods and literatures attest, parodic reflexivity commonly manifests itself in three principal forms: first, the text may propose itself as a potential parodied work; second, it may allude to other examples of its own story, thus signalling to the reader that it is merely one among many possible ones; third, it may even provide details of an alternative version, specific ways in which this might differ from the parody, itself already an alternative one. The text offers itself most easily as a potential parodied work by aligning itself directly with the work that it parodies. Ovid’s Amores

* With respect to reflexive narrative in general, Siegel suggests along similar lines that reflexivity refuses such a status: “Reflexivity is a permanently revolutionary dimension of literature that persists in resisting the yoke of any paradigm that attempts to obscure its own self-transforming qualities” (246f.).
provide a typical example of this first self-critical technique by making
a standard convention of the genre parodied—here, the poet’s wish for
immortality through this poetry—into a vehicle of parodic reflexivity.
This is the theme of Amores 1.15: "... mihi fama perennis / quaritur,
in toto semper ut orbis canat" (lines 7-8) (I seek everlasting fame, that
I may be celebrated forever in all the world). The following twenty-two
lines, well over half the poem, consist exclusively of examples of poets
who indeed live on through their work, and thus are models for the
poet of this one. Significantly, however, he includes not only Homer,
Hesiod, Sophocles, Virgil, and others, but also the love-elegists them-
selves, Tibullus and Gallus, objects of the Amores’ parody.

donec erunt ignes arcanus Cupidinis arma,

discernit numeri, culpae Tibulle, tu;

Gallus et Hesperus et Gallus notus Eois,
et sua cuncta Gallus nota Lyceoris erit.

(As long as the torch and bow are weapons of Cupid, your verse, elegant Tibullus, will
be known; Gallus will be renowned in both the West and the East, and with Gallus his
Lyceus.)

Proclaiming the immortality of Gallus, founder of the Roman love-elegy
that Ovid parodies, is not only ironic; it also suggests that the manifesta-
tion of Gallus’s fame most ready to hand—the parody itself—may
likewise be the means by which the poet’s wish for his own work will
be fulfilled. His seemingly conventional desire for immortality through
his poetry is colored by the nature of the example he hopes to follow:
Gallus has achieved immortality by being parodied, and Ovid may do
the same.

This is made even more explicit in the Tibullus example: not only is
he, like Gallus, one of the poets parodied in the Amores, but also the
specific allusion to the weapons of Cupid links him directly to the parodist.
Ovid’s remark about the immortality of Tibullus’s work is easily trans-
ferred to his own, which, as the title makes clear, is likewise dependent,
albeit paradoxically, on Cupid’s “torch and bow”; lines 37-38 remind us
overly that Ovid’s subject is love. But the parallel has a twist: Tibullus
lives on in Ovid, the Amores, a parody, and these verses thus imply that
Ovid may also. The conventional formula for partial immortality that
closes the poem—the poet will die, but his work will survive—is again
colored by his example, Tibullus’s immortality not only via his own

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poems but also via the parody: “parsque mei multa superates erit” (and
a great part of me will survive) suggests fame not only through the
Amores but, on the model of Tibullus, through the Amores as an object
of parody.

The same reflexive technique, likening the parody to the parodied
work, is used by Jane Austen in Northanger Abbey, again through a
convention of the genre parodied: the famous defense of writing and
reading novels that the author addresses to the reader in Chapter 5
actually offers her own novel as the subject of a later work. Northanger
Abbey has long been seen to parody the gothic novel and to follow in
some ways the pattern of Don Quixote: Catherine Morland is a mock-
heroine who interprets her experience in terms of the sentimental novels
that she so avidly devours, with their tales of mystery, horror, and the
sinister adventures that befall a young innocent in a remote romantic
setting, exemplified by the works of Mrs. Radcliffe and her “imitators.”

Catherine’s “visions of romance” (201) bring her not only a comical
disappointment of expectations, but, more seriously, the near-cata-
srophe of losing the good opinion of the young man with whom she
has fallen in love, Henry Tilney. Her naïveté is not limited to taking
her readings too seriously and behaving according to them; it prevents
her even from appreciating Henry’s parody of them in Chapter 20, when
he teases her with an exaggerated picture of life at Northanger, pieced

together with the clichés of gothic fiction. Catherine fails to perceive
the humor until Henry, unable to contain his laughter, leaves it to her
to imagine the rest of the story, and thus brings her back to reality.
Later, alone in her room at Northanger, she nevertheless applies his
parody to her situation, in the episode of the ebony cabinet in Chapter
21; a roll of paper discovered in it turns out to be not a manuscript
recounting secret terrors in the abbey, as she had imagined, but simply
old laundry lists. Catherine ultimately learns her lesson, not only that
the “visions of romance” are inappropriate to life, but also, through
the pettiness and cruelty of Henry’s father, that life has dangers less
obvious than those contained in such romances, but all the more sinister
for that.

In Chapter 5, the author nevertheless justifies the writing of novels
and her heroine’s reading of them, thus linking her own work with
those parodied in it. She argues that novelists should band together
and support one another in order to protect themselves against the abuse
and censure of their many critics:

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11 For a commentary on Book I, see J. Barsby 159, who cites parallels for the immortality
theme in Roman literature, notably Eumenid, Virgil, Horace, and Propertius. Ovid himself
used it often (Barsby 169). All translations, here and below, are my own.

12 "Sustine tamen consurgens mentem tam gloriae / Atque a sollicito multo amante
lega" (and may I sustain on my breast the myrtle that fears the cold, and so be ever
read by anxious lovers).
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[Extract from the text]

In the guise of authorial self-defense, a common convention of narrative, Austen ironically identifies the critical purposes of her story, a work that parodies the kind of novels defended here and satirizes the effect of reading them uncritically, as Catherine does. The "censure" that she attributes to other writers, who refuse to allow novel-reading in their works, is actually best accomplished by her own method of including it, i.e., patronizing the heroines of other novels (the gothic romances) in her own. The most effective criticism of the gothic novel, in other words, consists not in ignoring it or hypocritically maligning or repudiating it, as do other novelists, but in parodying it, revising and reusing it comically in one's own work, as Henry does in Chapter 20, and Austen does in Northanger Abbey. In the light of this, the passage is not wholly ironic: parody is indeed not as ungenerous and impolitic as the practice of novelists that the author reproaches. It criticizes, but does not have the hypocrisy of those who degrade "by their contemptuous censure the very performances, to the number of which they are themselves adding." Through its essential self-referentiality, parody, rather, constantly demonstrates its awareness of contributing to the tradition that it mocks.

Austen illustrates this last point in particular by remarking that the heroine of one novel should be patronized by that of another. While appearing to justify Catherine's reading and (ironically) the novel's account of it, this comment actually refers to the heroine and the novel at hand. It suggests that Catherine's story should be read by another, future heroine, as the gothic romances were by her, and given the same parodic treatment that her story — Northanger Abbey itself — gives to them. Austen authorizes others to use her novel as she does the gothic romances, i.e., parodically. The parody may be parodied in its turn.

Although she provides no example of such a future version, as do some parodists, Austen does imply in the final pages that the story told by the parody is not the whole one. Northanger Abbey here realizes the creative implications of the genre by opening a window onto another, related story of which it offers only a tantalizing glimpse. In closing, the parody actually creates another work, to be told at some other moment. To the reader's surprise, Catherine's friend Eleanor Tilney marries a young man previously unmentioned and unsuspected, but not wholly unconnected to the present story:

Concerning the one in question therefore I have only to add — (aware that the rules of composition forbid the introduction of a character not connected with my tale) — that this was the very gentleman whose negligent servant left behind him that collection of washing-bills, resulting from a long visit at Northanger, by which my heroine was involved in one of her most alarming adventures. (217)

In yet another authorial address to the reader, Austen makes a comic detail of the parody — the washing lists that Catherine mistook for a mysterious manuscript in Chapter 21 — generate a new story, Eleanor's romance with her future husband. The parenthetical aside, justifying the introduction of the young man by his association with the ebony cabinet episode, insists on the connection between the two stories: the second narrative is born of the first, the parody, even though the events which it recounts may have happened earlier or simultaneously. As this is not the parody's story told in a different way, it does not represent the direct self-criticism that I have been describing; however, it does illustrate the property of parody to provide from within itself the suggestion and even details of another work, here, as is typical of parody, by mocking a standard convention of narrative, to which it draws attention in the parenthetical aside to the reader.

A second self-reflexive technique consists in alluding to other, usually future versions of the same story told by the parody. Sheridan's play, The Critic, or A Tragedy Rehearsed (1779), provides an example of this in a format particularly suited to reflexivity, the rehearsal play. It parodies the conventions of contemporary sentimental drama through the device of the theatrical rehearsal, in the manner of Buckingham's earlier parody of heroic drama, The Rehearsal (1671). A rehearsal of the romantic tragedy, The Spanish Armada, by the critic-turned-author Pult constitutes Acts II and III, and provides the occasion for a simultaneous commentary on it, bring out the stock features of contemporary theater that Sheridan mocked: extraneous elements to the plot, a subject drawn from history and enlivened by a love-conflict, a sub-plot having little connection with the main plot, a mad scene, a discovery scene, references to Shakespeare, and so on, many of which have already been ridiculed in Act I, with its satire on authors, critics, managers, and performers. The use of the rehearsal play as a means of mirroring, commenting on, and criticizing drama from within has been studied elsewhere, but not the relation of its self-reflexive devices to the parody. The idea of repetition with a difference, understood in parody, is present in that of

the rehearsal itself; Sheridan emphasizes this here by replaying many of the individual scenes within it a number of times. Moreover, the changes made to the play during the rehearsal by all present—actors, critics, and even Puff himself—implies that the parody too can be altered, improved, or redone; it thus provides for a reworking of itself. But Sheridan openly implicates his play as a whole by its final line, spoken by Puff at the end of the rehearsal: "Well, pretty well—but not quite perfect—so ladies and gentlemen, if you please, we'll rehearse this piece again tomorrow." (385). The reflexive action of the parody upon itself is guaranteed by the obvious play on "piece": not only Puff's The Spanish Armada, but The Critic too. Like Puff's play, Sheridan's may be "rehearsed" again and changes made to it. As Buckingham's parodic Rehearsal inspired The Critic, or A Tragedy Rehearsed, perhaps this parody also will give rise to another one, through another rehearsal, as suggested in the final line.

The reflexivity of Don Quixote has been studied in some detail, particularly with regard to the publication in Part II of a book recounting the knight's previous exploits, or what one would have read as Part I. But Cervantes' novel presents a special case of the self-reflexive and self-critical technique which I have been describing—calling its own version into question by suggesting the possibility of other versions—one of which is the story indeed already existed: the apocryphal Don Quixote, Part II by the pseudonymous Avellanada from Tordeillas. At the end of Part I, Cervantes had left open the possibility of a sequel—a new sally of Don Quixote, allegedly to Saragossa—to be brought out by a scholar who had been given the manuscript to decipher: hence the quotation from Orlando furioso that closes the first volume, "forse altri canterà con miglior plettro" (perhaps another will sing with a better lute). Avellanada had met this challenge with his own Segunda Parte, which appeared in 1614, before Cervantes' own Part II had been published. Cervantes in turn brilliantly worked Avellanada's account into his own, and especially into his hero's experience, in a number of episodes, casting doubt on its veracity, ridiculing it, and contrasting it with the "reality" told by the parody. But in the final chapter of Part II, Cervantes uses the satire against Avellanada also to support a main point of his parody: the claims to absolute authority of the Arab Cide Hamete Benengeli, ostensible author of Don Quixote's history, are radically undercut and called into question. Cide Hamete might have learned the lesson of his hero and of parody itself, i.e. that stories, including histories like his own, are not life, nor truth, but interpretations that may be challenged or retold.

The parody's self-criticism is prepared by the final words of the hero himself, who, having returned to his village in defeat, publicly renounces on his deathbed his previous conduct, and the story it inspired, as utter foolishness:

"Hem, amigo de los dichos señores mis albares que sí la buena suerte les traerá a conocer al autor que dicen que compuso una historia que anda por ahí con el título de Segunda Parte de las hazañas de don Quijote de la Mancha, de mi parte le pido, cuan encarecidamente se pueda, perdone la ocasión que sin yo pensando le di de haber escrito tantas y tan grandes disparates como en ella escribió; porque parto desta vida con escrúpulo de haberle dado motivo para escribirlos." (1066)

(Hem, I beseech the aforesaid gentlemen my executors, that if good fortune leads them to meet the author who is said to have composed a history going around under the title The Second Part of the Exploits of don Quijote de la Mancha, they shall beg him on my behalf, as earnestly as possible, to excuse the opportunity which I unintentionally gave him of writing so many and such great pieces of nonsense as are written in it.)

The hero's disclaimer does not simply discredit Avellanada's version, but also aims at the ocasión that he gave him of writing it, i.e. the exploits themselves. These, of course, have been recounted not only in Avellanada's Segunda Parte, but in the story that we have just read as well. The spurious account here ironically mirrors Cide Hamete's "authentic" one: the parody calls all versions into question, including its own.

Although the hero thus renounces his story, Cide Hamete does not do the same. He is introduced in the final chapter precisely as the reason for which the death certificate was drawn up: so that no other author could revive the hero for more stories: "... y que el tal testimonio pedía para quitar la ocasión de algún otro autor que Cide Hamete Benengeli le resueltase falsamente, y hiciese inacabables historias de sus hazañas" (1067).

The idea of interminable stories and false revivals is firmly planted in the reader's mind through the precaution taken to avoid them. In his final address to his pen, and to the reader, the Arab historian does likewise, personally defending his version as the sole genuine one but therein referring to other versions, not only Avellanada's but future ones as well. After warning other authors not to take his pen from the hook where he has hung it, Cide Hamete makes the pen itself suggest the possibility that someone may do so:

Para mí solo escribió don Quijote, yo para él; él supo obrar y yo escribir; solos los dos somos para en uno, a despecho y pesar del escritor fingido y torpesísimo que se atrevió.
o se ha de atrever, a escrito con pluma de ave nostra y mal delibrado los hazañas de mi valeroso caballero... a quien adverterías, si acaso llegas a conocerle, que deje reposar en la sepultura los cansados y ya podridos huesos de don Quijote, y no le quiera llevar, contrá todos los ínclitos de la muerte, a Castilla la Vieja; haciéndole salir de la fosa donde real y de prados amanecen, y a todos los que podrán verle, que han hecho tantas maravillas y que han tenido tantos heridos de bañillos... a los que hay que hacer bañada de tantas como hicieron tantos andantes caballeros, bastan las dos que él hizo... (1608)

(For me alone was Don Quijote born, and I for him; he knew how to act, I to write; we two alone are one, despite that false Tordesillas; I am here who has served, and may dare again, to write with his coarse and thinly trimmed ostrich quill of the exploits of my valorous knight... whom you will warn, should perchance you come to know him, that he should let the weary and already rotting bones of Don Quijote rest in the tomb, and not try to carry him, against all the canons of death, to Old Castle; making him leave the grave where he really and truly lies stretched out at full length, powerless to make a third journey and a new self; that to make fun of those that so many knights errant made, the two that he made suffice...}

The stab at Avellaneda once again reflects back on the parody. Cide Hamete's effort to bury Don Quijote definitively alludes not only to an existing, false version ("o se ha de atrever"), but also to a possible future one ("o se ha de atrever"), perhaps a third part with a Castilian scenario such as Avellaneda had foreseen at the end of his work. What especially undermines Cide Hamete's claims, and his refusal of other versions and sequels, is that he is an Arab, and we have been warned repeatedly in the novel by the "editor"/narrator that Arabs are liars. We thus cannot have full confidence in his purported authority over Don Quijote's story. In this way, Cervantes subtly makes the satire serve the self-critical purposes of the parody. Through the notorious unreliability of the Arab historian, the "tercera jornada y salida nueva" remain definite possibilities, and even the alternative, apocryphal Part II may be as valid as his own. Cide Hamete's censure leaves open the story that it means to close forever. Moreover, the proof that his story did not remain as he intended it lies in the parody's famous displaced authorship, which we have ever before us: his account had to be translated by a Spanish-speaking Moor, and then "edited" by the narrator, in order to reach the state in which we, the readers, have it.

Providing details of an alternative version combines the reflexive and creative functions of parody, calling into question the authority of the parody's account by having it anticipate a different one. Laforgue's Hamlet, the first in his collection of prose tales, the Moralités légendaires (1887), which retell legendary stories according to 1880s Decadence,

offers a clear example of this third reflexive technique: not only does it allude to other Hamlets, but it also suggests how his own, the parody, might have turned out differently. At the end of the story, the Decadent Hamlet has died at the hands of Laëtés, and everything has returned to normal in Elsinore. The final sentence remarks ironically: "Un Hamlet de moins; la race n'en est pas perdue, qu'on se le dise!" (47) (One Hamlet less; the race is not lost for it, of that you can be sure). "One Hamlet less" implies others in the line; and "race" refers not simply to the human race, but more precisely to the race of Hamlets. Laforgue's Hamlet may have died, but there are other ones to carry on the name. The parody acknowledges that its version is not the only one, or the definitive one, or even, ironically, an important one ("la race n'en est pas perdue"), but merely one among many, past, present, and future.

But Laforgue masterfully exploits the relativism implied in parody for creative ends also. He has in fact prepared the reader for this final line in the death scene earlier when, in a curious parenthetical aside inserted at the moment of the stabbing, the narrator realizes that Laëtés could have been the hero of the story:

A ce moment, on entend dans la nuit toute spectralemente claire l'aboi surhumainement seul d'un chien de ferme à la lune, que le coeur de cet excellent Laëtés (qui aurait plutôt mérité, j'y soupçonne, hélas trop tard, d'être le héros de cette narration) déchérée, déborde de l'excipable anonymat de sa destinée de trente ans! C'en est trop! Était-il saisi d'une main Hamlet à la gorge, de Fautre il lui plante au cœur un poignard vrai. (45)

At that moment, the barking of a farm dog at the moon sounds in the ghostly night, a barking to surhumanly lonely the heart of this excellent Laëtés (who would instead have superhumanly lonely the heart of this excellent Laëtés to whom, alas too late, to be the hero of this narrative) overflows, overflows with the inexplicable anonymity of his destiny of thirty years! It's too much! And seizing Hamlet by the throat with one hand, with the other he plants a real dagger into his heart.

Laforgue calls attention to the story's many possible alternatives by citing one, and also to the unpredictable element of chance that determines which version will find expression. The aside suggests that Laëtés might have dominated this Hamlet if the parodist had simply thought of the possibility earlier. It even gives the impression that he might have made a better, or at least more appropriate, hero ("excellent," "mérite," "hélas") than the ludicrous Decadent Hamlet.

But if Laëtés was denied the hero's role in this tale, Laforgue gives him the pis-aller of possible future stardom. Indeed, Laëtés here begins to look suspiciously like Hamlet, and thus Laforgue hints that he may indeed take over his role: like Hamlet, he is a thirty-year-old potential hero spurred on by the thought of his anonymity, this being one of Hamlet's obsessions throughout the parody; the deed induces madness, one of Hamlet's chief characteristics; Laëtés goes off, possibly to be-
come a monk ("se faire moine, peut-être," 46) again recalling Hamlet, who has earlier been described as looking like one. Laërtes took the revenge that Hamlet could not, and now may take over from Hamlet altogether, as the hero of a new story.

In thus proposing an alternative to his story from within, Laforgue uses the reflexive function of parody, which I have sought to illustrate, for creative ends: the parody leaves room for, and as here, sometimes explicitly indicates another version of the story it tells. To borrow the words of Laforgue's parody, this "Hamlet less" actually adds one more to the corpus, and proposes yet another, still to be realized, with Laërtes as hero. Hamlet himself sets an example for the reader of parody when he scornfully rejects its play and its moralité: "He! . . . je me moque de cette représentation et de sa moralité" (I don't care a bit about this performance and its moral) (40). Perhaps the larger Moralité, the parody itself, should ultimately be rejected too, revised and rewritten according to a different vision. In all parody, as in this one, the race will indeed not be lost, but rather continued and extended, for it.

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