The first line of Beckett’s short story ‘Dante and the Lobster’ should strike any reader familiar with Dante as being outrageously funny, ‘It was morning and Belacqua was stuck in the first of the canti in the moon’ (Beckett, 1972, 9). The joke begins with the name of Beckett’s character Belacqua (also used for the protagonist of his novel Dream of Fair to Middling Women), the representative of indolence in the Purgatorio. As one who waited until his deathbed to repent, he finds himself forced to wait at the base of Mount Purgatory before he can begin his climb to purgation and, eventually, heaven. In one of the few meagre jokes Dante allows himself in the Commedia, Belacqua informs the pilgrim, who is daunted by the prospect of the ascent, that he might be able to rest every so often (Aligheri, 1991a, 98–99). Dante’s Belacqua is stuck in a lethargy that delays his spiritual progress. On the other hand, Beckett’s Belacqua is stuck in an apparently loftier clime. The two moon canti in the Paradiso are some of the trickier passages in the whole poem and are a frequent stumbling block to Dante’s readers, especially modern ones sadly unversed in Dantine astronomy and optics. Beckett’s Belacqua is thus hardly the only reader to be stuck in the first of the canti in the moon. If, as is explained in the Epistle to Can Grande, the pilgrim in the Commedia is an allegorical representative of man’s quest for redemption (Aligheri, 1996, §11), then Beckett’s Belacqua is, in part, an allegorical representative of
reading the allegorical conundrums of the *Commedia*. The pilgrim has his progress, Belacqua his aporia. Belacqua thus stands in as a proxy for the difficulties of parsing Dantean allegory. Indeed, Belacqua is not just conflated with a perplexed reader of the *Commedia*, he is also conflated with Dante, the author, in that in the moon canto the pilgrim is characterised as an apprentice reader of the divine.

The word ‘stuck’ provides a further resonance with the *Commedia*. The pilgrim’s voyage through heaven occurs on a purely spiritual, that is not physical, realm. Instead of standing on the moon in an Armstrongian or Aldrinian manner, the pilgrim is within the moon, ‘com’ acqua recepe / raggio di luce permanendo unita’ [as water receives / a ray of light yet remains undisturbed] (Aligheri, 1991b, 35–36). His body is thus stuck in the body of the moon, as if two bodies were occupying the same space. This is described as being a physical impossibility on earth and yet ‘Lí si vedrà ciò che tenem per fede’ [Here is seen what there is held by faith] (Aligheri, 1991b, 43). In other words, for the pilgrim being stuck in the moon is a sign of his spiritual progress towards God, whereas for Belacqua it is still just an aporia.

In the first moon canto, the pilgrim asks Beatrice why there are spots on the moon. In his question he notes that people have interpreted these dark signs (‘segni’ [Aligheri, 1991b, 49]) as being the marks of Cain.¹ Beatrice’s answer refutes this superstition and Dante uses her explanation to refute a hypothesis he had previously advanced. Belacqua, apparently, is having some problems tracing out the logic of Dante’s revision. In the *Convivio*, Dante had explained the uneven mixture of light and dark on the moon’s surface in terms of earthly physics: different physical properties (‘raritade’) cause variations in reflectivity (Aligheri, 1980, 9). The pilgrim alludes to this earlier belief when he explains to Beatrice that he understands the moon’s dark spots as being occasioned by ‘i corpi rari e densi’ [bodies rare and dense] (Aligheri, 1991b, 60); that is, some parts of the moon are rarer and less fit to reflect light. Beatrice disabuses the pilgrim of this not completely absurd hypothesis. Since the pilgrim is now in heaven, stuck within the moon, such materialistic comprehension is inadequate to the world of faith. Indeed, while the pilgrim’s
passage in the previous two cantiche could be understood in terms of physical motion through space (down through hell and up through purgatory), the passage through heaven is of an entirely different order. Beatrice’s explanation is thus an instruction in and of faith, an elucidation of spiritual, as opposed to physical, causality. She explains that each of the nine heavens receives a light from heaven that it then imparts down to the lower heavens within its circuit until, finally, the heavenly light arrives down on earth. Heavenly light is thus translated through the media of the nine heavens. Beatrice describes this process of translation as a form of imprinting: “l ciel cui tanti lumi fanno bello, / de la menta profunda che lui volve / prende l’image e fassenne suggello’ [the heaven, which is made fair by manifold lights / from the profound mind that moves it, takes the image and makes it a seal] (Aligheri, 1991b, 130–32). Through this imprinting of a seal, heavenly light is thus differentiated on its way down. The signs on the moon are signs of God, not signs of matter nor signs of Cain. For the pilgrim, to be stuck on the moon is to inhabit this spiritual, and not physical, seal.

Just as the moon absorbs a heavenly light already refracted through the eight heavens above in order to impart it below, the pilgrim receives guidance from God through Beatrice. The pilgrim’s understanding is thus informed by divine light refracted through Beatrice: ‘voglio informar di luce sì vivace, / che ti tremolerà nel suo aspetto’ [I will inform you with a light so vivid / that you will tremble in its aspect] (Aligheri, 1991b, 110–11). In other words, Beatrice’s explanation of the spots on the moon is part of the pilgrim’s instruction in how to properly read the signs of divinity. She is not merely explaining an astronomical phenomenon to him, rather she is imparting divine wisdom. And, just as the pilgrim receives instruction from above, he imparts down below to his readers in his rôle as poet.

Belacqua’s lunar aporia is a metonym of the pilgrim’s: ‘He was so bogged that he could move neither backward nor forward. Blissful Beatrice was there, Dante also, and she explained the spots on the moon to him. She showed him in the first place where he was at fault, then she put up her own explanation. She had it from God, therefore he could rely on its being accurate in every particular … he would understand at least the meanings of the words …
and make formal retraction of his own opinion’ (Beckett, 1972, 9). However, unlike the pilgrim under Beatrice’s guidance, Belacqua is not entirely being edified even though he is also guided in his quest by a female authority, his Italian instructor, Signorina Adriana Ottolenghi. In setting up Ottolenghi as his instructor, Belacqua again conflates himself with the pilgrim and her with Beatrice: ‘Also about the spots on the moon. If she could not tell him there and then she would make it up, only too gladly, against the next time’ (Beckett, 1972, 17). Indeed, just as Beatrice receives her wisdom straight from God, so too must Ottolenghi defer to a higher power when Belacqua asks her for guidance about the moon enigma. ‘The sweet creature! She would look it up in her big Dante when she got home. What a woman!’ (Beckett, 1972, 19).

From the moon, Dante progresses upwards to behold God (although with some complications that I shall address shortly), whereas for Belacqua being stuck in the moon is the high point of his day. In this way, in ‘Dante and the Lobster,’ we would have an allegory about reading allegory and more specifically an allegory about the insufficiency of allegory. Belacqua is no Dante, rather than be ennobled by divinity, he makes a toasted sandwich with all the alacrity of an autistic Kant, avoids running into anyone on the Dublin streets, argues with his cheese-monger, flirts awkwardly with Ottolenghi, and is surprised when his aunt informs him that the lobster he purchased must be boiled alive. ‘Well, thought Belacqua, it’s a quick death, God help us all’ (Beckett, 1972, 22). In the last line of the story the narrator explicitly rebukes Belacqua’s wistful sentiment with the comment: ‘It is not’ (Beckett, 1972, 22). This line introduces the possibility of a moral perspective, a stable point from which the reader might infer the irony of Belacqua’s static misapprehension of Dantean allegory (as well as his failure to understand how lobsters are cooked). The line itself however is not necessarily stable, Ruby Cohn remarks that Beckett once joked to her that he had considered changing the line to ‘Like Hell it is’ (Cohn, 2001, 391, n11). Such a change would be all the more appropriate since it would emphasise Belacqua’s reversal of Dante’s trajectory: Belacqua winds up in hell, after having started in heaven.

But even apropos the Commedia, Dante himself remarks the insufficiency of allegory. Over the centuries of Dantean
commentary, this issue has largely been thematised along the axis of the allegory of the theologian and the allegory of the poet. The split between these two typologies derives from the apparently incompatible emphases concerning allegory in the *Convivio* and the *Epistle to Can Grande*; the former advances the idea that the poet produces ‘una veritade ascosa sotto bella menzogna’ [a truth hidden under a beautiful lie] (Aligheri, 1980, 3), whereas the latter advocates that the *Commedia* must be read according to the fourfold exegesis normally reserved for scripture. The allegory of the poets grants the power of allegoresis to the poet’s genial rapport with language (his *ingegno*) and, unsurprisingly, the allegory of the theologians grants it to the poet’s rapport with God, and so the poet’s task is merely reduced to translating God’s power of signification onto the page. The difference between these two is whether the *Commedia* is to be read as scripture or as scrip, that is, a cunningly forged scripture.

The problem of how to construe allegory in the *Commedia* perhaps indicates a fundamental issue of allegory in that allegorisation is always already a mode of irony. In ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality,’ Paul de Man argues that irony and allegory ‘are two faces of the same fundamental experience of time’ in that they both indicate the unreliability of signification: ‘They are … linked in their common demystification of an organic world postulated in a symbolic mode of analogical correspondences or in a mimetic mode of representation in which fiction and reality could coincide’ (de Man, 1983, 226, 222). In other words, signification in both irony and allegory proceeds through *other words*. Since what is meant is not what is said and, allegory and irony depend upon the hermeneutic skills of the reader. For example, Beatrice’s instruction to the pilgrim could be construed as a lesson in how to properly, and thus without error, read divine allegoresis. Obviously both allegory and irony operate differently: allegory is sustained diachronically (that is, through narrative), whereas irony proceeds as a synchronic disruption, much like the narrator’s intrusion at the end of ‘Dante and the Lobster.’ But both, in that they somehow obliquely indicate some potential meaning not signified directly, testify to an inability of language to communicate directly and transparently. Because Dante cannot write divine truth, he resorts to allegory as the vehicle for ‘Trasumanar significar per verba’
[transcending signification through words] (Aligheri, 1991b, 70). But as the line following this states, transcending signification through words ‘non si poria’ [is not possible] (Aligheri, 1991b, 71), as he writes in the first canto of the *Paradiso*. On the one hand, Dante promises the possibility of communicating the divine experience, but on the other hand, in the very next line, he retracts said promise. It is as if Dante does not quite believe in his ability or authority to write the poem, and yet, like Beckett’s unnamable, this aporia is precisely what impels him to *go on*. This retraction ‘non si poria’ negates both the possibility of reading the *Commedia* through either the allegory of the poets or the allegory of the theologians since both modes, in their own way, promise a truth whereas Dante seems somewhat more ambivalent about the matter. And so, with this line he indicates that a communication of the divine is not going to happen.

If Dante aims towards an impossible transcendence of signification through language, Belacqua’s goals are somewhat more modest, although by no means any less impossible. During his Italian lesson, he asks Ottolenghi how to translate the following line from the *Inferno*: ‘qui vive la pietà quando è ben morta’ (Aligheri, 1990, 28). The problem here for the treacherous translator is that the word *pietà* means both pity and piety and so this line could mean either ‘here lives piety when it is quite dead’ or ‘here lives pity when it is quite dead.’ Ottolenghi, unable to answer Belacqua, asks if ‘it is absolutely necessary to translate’ this line (Beckett, 1972, 19). Translating Dante’s signification appears to not be possible, at least not into English, which would indicate yet another place where Belacqua is stuck. The problem here is that the choice one makes in translation here conditions which allegorical mode is to be preferred, the allegory of the theologians or the allegory of the poets. The problem is not just one of translation, even though the English language lacks a single word that can mean both pity and piety; the ambiguity resides squarely within the Italian. The problem the translator faces merely indicates a problem that confronts any reader of the *Commedia*: how to understand *pietà* in this context. If piety then the allegory of the theologians, but if pity then the allegory of the poets prevails. In a sense, the undecidability of this line suggests that the dilemma of the allegory of the theologians versus the allegory of the poets is a
false choice, or at the very least, not necessarily the most pertinent issue in reading the Commedia. 

Beckett appears to have made a choice in this problem of translation, but one that is not strictly within an either/or economy of pity or piety. While making his toast, which he prefers done evenly, that is, unmottled, unlike the moon, Belacqua ponders the pilgrim’s initial suggestion that the marks on the moon represent the marks of Cain:

For the tiller in the field the thing was simple, he had it from his mother. The spots were Cain with his truss of thorns, dispossessed, cursed from the earth, fugitive and vagabond. The moon was that countenance fallen and branded, seared with the first stigma of God’s pity, that an outcast might not die quickly. It was a mix-up in the mind of the tiller, but that did not matter. It had been good enough for his mother, it was good enough for him (Beckett, 1972, 12).

As Beckett calls it in his poem ‘Alba,’ the ‘branded moon’ (Beckett, 2002, 17) is seared with the mark of God’s pity. This etiology is absent from the Commedia but is here attributed to a confusion of the earliest observers, that is, interpreters, of the moon, the tillers of the field. But, of course, in this formulation interpreter, the tiller, is explicitly conflated with Cain, ‘a tiller of the ground’ (Gen. 4: 2). The interpreter is also the sinner and thus someone who is, potentially, pitiable.

Indeed, although Belacqua prefers his toast untainted, he looks for, and finds, defects everywhere. He prefers his cheese to have a ‘faint fragrance of corruption’ (Beckett, 1972, 14) and when his cheesemonger fails to provide him with a suitably rank Gorgonzola, he complains loudly. The cheese on sale is defective by Belacqua’s standards precisely because it is not defective enough by most other people’s. After he threatens the beleaguered cheesemonger, he warns him, ‘Do you mark me?’ (Beckett, 1972, 15). Marks are all around Belacqua.

Beckett thus installs marks of corruption and pity into Belacqua’s Dantean trajectory. It seems that Belacqua wants to read pity into Dante’s cosmology as well as into his own. As he hands the
doomed lobster over to his aunt, Belacqua thinks ‘Why not piety and pity both, even down below? Why not mercy and Godliness together? A little mercy in the stress of sacrifice, a little mercy to rejoice against judgment’ (Beckett, 1972, 21). He would be unstuck if there would be a word that would mean both pity and piety down below. But, as it is, there is not, as is evinced in the lobster’s slow death.

It also seems that Beckett himself preferred to posit pity in Dante: in his poem ‘Text,’ he appears to have essayed his own translation of this problematic line from the *Inferno* as ‘pity is quick with death / Presumptuous passionate fool come now / to the sad maimed shades / and stand cold / on the cold moon’ (Beckett, 2002, 201). Here Beckett sides with pity and consigns the moon, and the lesson Beatrice imparts there, to sterility.

In the essay ‘The Pitying Torturer,’ Borges asks how one could justify Dante’s compassion towards the sinners he encounters in hell, notably Francesca. His argument here relates the problem of pity to the issue of the allegory of the theologians versus the allegory of the poets. Borges proffers four possible solutions. The first is merely technical, Dante projects compassion merely as a form of local colour to help enliven his text with narrative poignancy. The second understands the *Commedia* as Dante’s dream (a motif within Borges’s readings of Dante) and construes his compassion as Dante’s means of making the dream more poignant to himself. The third posits the compassion as merely being one of the stages the pilgrim undertakes on his way to God. It is, of course, the fourth possibility that interests Borges. He writes:

Dante tells the story of Francesca’s sin with such delicate compassion that all of us feel its inevitability. That is how the poet must have felt it, in defiance of the theologian who argued in the *Purgatorio* (XVI. 70) that if actions depended on the influence of the stars, our free will would be annulled, and to reward good while punishing evil would be an injustice. Dante understands and does not forgive; this is the insoluble paradox (Borges, 1999, 286).

If Belacqua had asked if there could be both pity and piety, both mercy and Godliness, then Borges answers that with Dante the
paradox is that there is understanding, but no mercy. In other words, pity is delimited by piety. Pity is not possible in that it is always on the horizon, as with the ambiguous polysemy of the word *pietà*, but this possibility is always ever foreclosed. Borges admits his solution is not logical, but that is precisely the point: even though Dante strives towards a theologian’s allegory, he cannot quite resist a bit of, well, poetic licence. For Borges, Dante the poet writes, or attempts to write, an allegory of the theologians but always remembers that he is still a poet, just a poet. In writing a poem where the characters’ fates are pre-ordained by the poet, the poet still evinces sympathy towards his doomed characters without ever quite negating their doomed fates. In this way, the allegory of the theologians is ironised because it can never quite banish the allegory of the poets, and, obviously, the reverse would also be the case. Piety can never quite fully override, or overwrite, pity. Precisely because allegory is multiple, in that it depends upon a multiplication of possible signification, Dante’s allegory is neither of the poets nor of the theologians, but rather, somehow, equivocates between the two. Because allegory is multiple, no single mode of reading Dante will be adequate.

In his essay ‘Beatrice’s Last Smile,’ Borges adds another dimension between the interrelation of the two allegorical modes. In canto XXXI of the *Paradiso*, in what he calls one of the most moving lines in literature, Beatrice departs from the pilgrim: ‘Così orai; e quella, sì lontana / come parea, sorrisi e riguardommi; / poi si tornò all’etterna fontana’ [So did I pray; and she, so distant / as she seemed, smiled and looked on me, / then turned again to the eternal fountain] (Aligheri, 1991b, 91–93). Reading this through the allegory of the theologians is a simple enough matter: faith, as embodied by Beatrice, is the means for attaining divinity and once divinity has been attained, faith is no longer required. Such a reading seems to Borges to be too cold and neglects the detail of Beatrice’s final smile as she turns away from Dante for one last time. Borges notes that this passage is preceded by an encomium of sorts to Beatrice: just as she is on the verge of disappearing, the pilgrim claims to finally fully understand and appreciate her beauty and beatitude. This appreciation highlights the pain of the separation. And so Borges’s reading of this passage shows the contamination of the allegory of the theologians by the allegory
of the poets:

We must keep one incontrovertible fact in mind, a single humble fact: the scene was imagined by Dante. For us, it is very real; for him, it was less so. (The reality, for him, was that first life and then death had taken Beatrice from him.) Forever absent from Beatrice, alone and perhaps humiliated, he imagined the scene in order to imagine he was with her. Unhappily for him, happily for the centuries that would read him, his consciousness that the meeting was imaginary distorted the vision. Hence the appalling circumstances, all the more infernal for taking place in the empyrean: the disappearance of Beatrice, the elder who replaces her, her abrupt elevation to the Rose, the fleetingness of her glance and smile, the eternal turning away of the face. The horror shows through in the words: come parea refers lontana but contaminates sorrise (Borges, 1999, 304).

Borges reads this line, in accord with Longfellow’s translation, as meaning that it seemed as if she smiled, the smile is an apparition, a contrivance of the poet, a sign that Beatrice had always already been separated from the poet and not just from the pilgrim preparatory to his final ascent. The smile thus indicates that Dante is unable to surrender to divinity. Dante installs the smile as a wistful sign of Beatrice’s human pity, not divine piety. That the smile was merely an apparition suggests the triumph, albeit incomplete and qualified, of his piety.

The Paradiso ends with the pilgrim beholding God, but this is an experience that eludes the poet completely: ‘Così la neve al sol si disigilla; / così al vento nelle foglie levi / si perdea la sentenza di Sibilla’ [As snow under the sun is unsealed; / and so beneath the wind on the light leaves / were lost the prophecies of the Sibyl] (Alighieri, 1991b, 64–66). The memory of beholding God exceeds the poet’s faculties and thus cannot be registered in language. The remembrance of the experience has been forgotten and all that remains is the erased trace: the melted track in the snow. In this way the Paradiso ends with a retraction much like the retraction of the possibility of transcending signification through words made at the cantiche’s beginning.
The cause of this erasure can be remarked only after the putative event as an effect of that erasure: the simile of the sun that has melted or unsealed the snow. The word Dante uses here is one of his own coinage, disigilla, to lose form, which I will discuss further shortly. The memory of beholding God is effaced by having beheld God: beholding God is an inscription that retracts itself. The problem here is that the remembrance of things past is absent and is only to be supplemented by a trope: an allusion to the Sibyl of Virgil’s Æneid, no less, and this is after the ‘poeta che mi guidi’ [Alighieri, 1990, 10] had ostensibly been jettisoned from the pilgrim’s progression. And so all that the poet can do to register his belated transcendence is to deploy borrowed similes of aporia. Supposedly when the pilgrim is beyond the temporal figure, and has attained the eternal singularity, the poet retains a figural language only to the extent that it is always already an annulled trace. The divine experience remains other: different from and inaccessible to the belated writing that purportedly it had inaugurated.

The paradisic experience is thus disigillato. Disigillare is the privation of sigillare (inscribing, imprinting, more commonly suggellare). Disigillare thus could be translated as ex-scribe. At its conclusion, the Commedia thus retracts the very possibility of writing in that the only possible trace of the paradisic experience is an effaced trace. Indeed, the word suggellare, as I noted earlier, was how Beatrice described to the pilgrim the imprinting of divinity upon the moon and the other celestial bodies. God takes away from the poet that which he had given the pilgrim on the moon. The divine remains under erasure.

In yet another piece on Dante, Borges remarks this forgetting. He writes of the leopard Dante meets in the first canto of the Inferno and how this leopard is ignorant of its allegorical import because ‘the machine of the world is exceedingly complex for the simplicity of a savage beast’ (Borges, 1998, 323). Borges contrasts the beast’s ignorance with Dante’s:

Years later, Dante was to die in Ravenna, as unjustified and alone as any other man. In a dream, God told him the secret purpose of his life and work; Dante, astonished, learned at last who he was and what he was, and he blessed the bitterness
of his life. Legend has it that when he awoke, he sensed that he had received and lost an infinite thing, something he would never be able to recover, or even to descry from afar, because the machine of the world is exceedingly complex for the simplicity of men (Borges, 1998, 323).

Borges thus construes the *Commedia* as an allegory about the impossibility of writing an allegory, divine or otherwise. Such incompetence is, of course, the Beckettian trope *par excellence*. In Borges’s reading of Dante any supposed allegory of the theologians is invariably contaminated by an allegory of the poet. Such contamination is perhaps endemic to allegory, as Paul de Man has argued. Dante, a human, cannot write divinity, he cannot transcend signification through words, yet in being unable to go on in his pilgrimage, he nevertheless goes on. Consonant with Dante’s faith is his ‘fidelity to failure’ (Beckett, 1984, 145), to use Beckett’s description of the effect of Bram Van Velde’s paintings. Dante may project towards the allegory of the theologians, but he still remains within the horizon of the allegory of the poets and this tension is signalled with the word *pietà*, which for Belacqua occasions a problem of translation. In this way Belacqua’s aporia of translation is a metonym of Dante’s aporia of faith. What we would have in ‘Dante and the Lobster,’ in its reading of the *Commedia*, is an allegory of the horror of the realisation of the complete and utter absence of allegory in the world below. Such a realisation was already indicated in the *Commedia* since the machine of the world is too complex for allegory.

**NOTES**

1. This explanation is also alluded to in the *Inferno* (Aligheri, 1990, 126).
2. The proponents of the allegory of poets see the *Divina Commedia* essentially as a *fabula*, a poetic construct in which theology, figuralism and Dante’s prophetic vocation, which manifestly are the props of the poem, are part and parcel of the fictional strategy, the literal sense of which is a pure fiction. For those critics, such as Singleton, who argue in favour of the allegory of theologians, the poem is written in imitation of God’s way of writing and, like Scripture, it exceeds metaphor and comes forth with the “irreducibility of reality itself” (Mazzotta, 230–31).
3. Daniela Caselli also emphasises the intractability of translating ‘pietà’ in her reading of ‘Dante and the Lobster’ (Caselli, 59–62).

4. Paul de Man remarks a basic implication of translations: ‘They disarticulate, they undo the original, they reveal that the original was always already disarticulated. They reveal that their failure, which seems to be due to the fact that they are secondary in relation to the original, reveals an essential failure, an essential disarticulation which was already there in the original (de Man 1986, 84).

5. Mazzotta defines the problem of the two allegories as being entirely interpretive: ‘the question of whether Dante’s allegory belongs to a theological or fictional mode cannot be simply solved, as critics would have it, by some a priori decision about the fictiveness or reality of the literal sense. Dante’s reader is constantly reminded, in effect, that the practice of reading deals precisely with how that decision can be made, that reading is an imaginary operation in which truth and fiction, far from being mutually exclusive categories, are simultaneously engendered by the ambiguous structure of metaphoric language’ (Mazzotta, 233).

6. ‘The sigillum marks the act of creation, the process of imposing a form and sealing it with authority: “disigilla,” thus, traces the distance between the book as a gathering Logos and the dispersion and openness of the poet’s book of memory; it stresses Dante’s technique of giving up the myth of the poet as Autore’ (Mazzotta, 265).

7. This word is also deployed elsewhere to denote a divine inscription: ‘Surge ai mortali per diverse foci / la lucerna del mondo… e la mondana cera / più a suo modo tempera e suggella’ (Alighieri, 1991b, 37–42). And in the Purgatorio: ‘e avea in atto impressa esta favella / ‘Ecce ancilla Dei,’ propriamente / come figura in cera si suggella’ (Alighieri, 1991a, 43–5).

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