6.

ANTHONY J. CASCARDI

Mimesis and Modernism: The Case of Jorge Luis Borges

For Sylvia Molloy

"Ignoro si la música sabe desesperar de la música y si el mármol del mármol, pero la literatura es un arte que sabe profetizar aquel tiempo en que habrá enmudecido, y escarnizarse con la propia virtud y enamorarse de la propia disolución y cortear su fin."¹

("I do not know whether music can give up hope in music, or marble in marble, but literature is an art that is able to foresee the moment when it will have grown silent, to scorn its own virtue, to become enamored with its own dissolution and to court its own death.")

"It is self-evident that nothing concerning art is self-evident anymore, not its inner life, not its relation to the world, not even its right to exist."²

During the years that have followed the publication of John Barth's provocative essay "The Literature of Exhaustion," the reading public has come to accept the fact that the writings of certain late and postmodernist authors—Borges, Calvino, and Eco among them—could not be measured by the same yardsticks of creative "originality" that served their romantic predecessors so well.³ This may have come as no surprise, as it was modernist practice itself that helped solidify the critique of romantic ideals. What greater challenge to the desires that supported romantic creativity than the deflationary gestures of minimalism, irony, parody, and pastiche? What is surprising is that so many "high modernist" writers continued to make a large investment in the principle of artistic innovation. Indeed, a central imperative of high modernist art was to "make it new." But just how to "make it new" was a very difficult question, given the realities of literary history and social circumstances. Nonetheless, the task could not be set aside by the heirs to the high modernist tradition. And so among many such writers, and Borges most prominently for my concerns, the great modernist call to innovation had to
Mimesis and Modernism

Mimesis was the basis for the theory of modernism. According to the modernist view, the artist is not a copyist but a creator, and the artist's role is to transform the world, not to imitate it. Mimesis, on the other hand, is a term borrowed from Greek philosophy, and it refers to the process of imitating or representing reality. The modernists, however, rejected the idea of mimesis, and instead focused on the idea of invention and创新.

The concept of mimesis was first developed by the ancient Greeks, particularly by Plato and Aristotle. Plato saw mimesis as a way of understanding the world through metaphor and analogy. Aristotle, on the other hand, saw mimesis as a way of communicating ideas and emotions through literature and art. However, the modernists rejected the idea of mimesis, and instead focused on the idea of invention and self-expression. This was reflected in the works of writers such as Walt Whitman and William Carlos Williams, who rejected the idea of mimesis and instead focused on creating new forms of expression.

The modernists believed that art should be a form of self-expression, and that the artist should be free to explore new forms and ideas. This was in contrast to the idea of mimesis, which was seen as a way of imitating reality. The modernists believed that art should be a way of exploring the world, and that the artist should be free to create new forms and ideas.

In conclusion, the modernists rejected the idea of mimesis, and instead focused on the idea of invention and self-expression. This was reflected in the works of writers such as Walt Whitman and William Carlos Williams, who rejected the idea of mimesis and instead focused on creating new forms of expression. The modernists believed that art should be a form of self-expression, and that the artist should be free to explore new forms and ideas.
criticism as modes of engagement of the past, and the problem of fictional worlds. Moreover, there is throughout Borges’s texts the commitment to a distinctive verbal inflection of ideas that marks them as irreducible to whatever notional content they may convey. Indeed, to regard Borges as a philosopher manqué is to overlook the excess of language and feeling over what mere thought would require. Likewise, to see Borges as a writer who has resigned himself to a vision of mimesis as the endless repetition of the same is to miss his sustained fascination with fabulation even while he thinks about the limits of fiction making, or to ignore his efforts to speak in a distinctive voice even in the face of worries that authoring is at bottom nothing more than a vehicle for the “mechanical reproduction” of ideas. Rather than confine this discussion to the question of literature and its exhaustion, or its possible supersession by philosophy, it may be more insightful to frame those issues in terms of the larger question of mimesis and as repetition that shapes the modernist predicament. Doing so may allow us better to respond to the self-reflective qualities of a body of work that took shape at a historical moment when literature’s continued existence as an autonomous discourse seemed to be in doubt.

One of Borges’s most often-cited texts, “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” raises these questions incisively. Pierre Menard, a relatively minor French author, dedicates his efforts to what Borges describes as “repeating a pre-existing book in a foreign language” (“repetir en un idioma ajeno un libro preexistente”). Menard rewrites Cervantes’ text exactly and completely. But although Menard’s Quixote is “verbally identical” to Cervantes’ novel it is also said to be “richer” and “more subtle.” How is this possible? In essays in the present volume, Deborah Knight and William Irwin treat this question as an instance of the problem of indiscernibles and the ontology of texts: if texts are identical in their constitution then are they the same? But the problem of Menard’s Quixote in relation to Cervantes’ is that they are at once identical and different. That is why my attention is drawn to what the question of indiscernibles leaves out. What is it that an understanding of mimesis as repetition fails to take into account? Borges’s “Pierre Menard” raises a question that is at once a philosophical puzzle and a modernist predicament: how to account for the kind of difference that literature can make when art seems obliged simply to repeat the past. One prong of an answer seems clear enough: to bring the limits of mimesis to consciousness, to make those limits explicit in discourse and in practice, is already to shift the terms of discourse and to add something “new” to what has already been said. Menard’s Quixote is just as much like Cervantes’ “original” as it is unlike it, and Borges’s text is of course identical to neither one: “The Cervantes text and the Menard text are verbally identical, but the second is almost infinitely richer. (More ambiguous, his detractors say—but ambiguity is richness).”

The result—wherein two apparently identical passages are reproduced within Borges’s text—may well involve a form of “repetition,” but Borges’s commentary renders the conventional literary distinction between “original” and “copy” of relatively little use in describing it.

“The Pierre Menard” addresses the questions of identity and difference with all the literary self-consciousness characteristic of modernist texts. To that “literary” self-consciousness Borges adds a philosophical spin that becomes further apparent in other texts. Consider “Funes, El Memorioso” as a case in point. For Ireneo Funes (the character with the prodigious memory who is the subject of the story), memory is a form of cognition that requires a full and complete correspondence with the world. It is also a form of mimesis, by which Funes repeats the world not just in conceptual or verbal terms, but sensuously and materially. He grasps the world by means of an internal mimesis that reproduces it in minute physiological detail rather than merely in concept or outline. In Funes’s mind “every visual image was linked to muscular sensations, thermal sensations, and so on.” Moreover, his reconstruction of the world in memory is conceived to be complete. It leaves no gaps: “He was able to reconstruct every dream, every daydream he had ever had. Two or three times he had reconstructed an entire day; he had never once erred or faltered, but each reconstruction had itself taken an entire day.” He is said to have remarked: “I, myself, alone, have more memories than all mankind since the world began.” Memory is a talent that grants Funes enormous power, and yet it immobilizes him. Funes is godlike “as monumental as bronze—older than Egypt, older than the prophesies and the pyramids”—but he is also a vanishing and ghostlike figure, as impotent as he is powerful. His memory is at once excessive and inadequate. Its contents are wholly unfiltered (he himself describes it as “like a garbage heap” (“como un vaciadero de basuras”)), and its structure renders him “incapable of general, platonist ideas” (“incapaz de ideas generales, platónicas,” F, p. 125). This mimesis of the world in memory treats everything as different and new and so undermines the very criteria by which what is “new” might be distinguished from what is familiar and old. Little wonder, then, that there is scant room for Funes’s own identity to take root: he remains unable to establish continuity with himself over time (“his own face in the mirror, his own hands, would surprise him each time anew”). And so, at the age of only twenty-one, Funes dies what might best be described as a minor death, having suffered first from insomnia and then from a pulmonary infection. There is a certain pathos in this detail that does not escape the narrator’s notice. It is worthy of further remark because of the affinity between Funes’s burdensome memory and the “memorial” work of narrative itself. Indeed, the narrator insists on this conjuncture from the very beginning of the text:

I recall him (though I have no right to speak that sacred verb—only one man on earth did, and that man is dead) holding a dark passionflower in his
Whimsies and Modernism

To be or not to be..." Hamlet's question is etched in stone. Time stands still in the moment when the words are spoken..."To be or not to be..." The problem of existential choice, momentary decision, is the central theme of the play. Hamlet's dilemma is also our own, for we must choose between life and death, action and inaction, Messsiah and Modernism. The choice is ours.

Library of Pisa, a country of contradictions, where the boundaries of art and science meet..."Linear perspective"..."Euclidean geometry"...the confluence of two worlds, the fusion of two cultures..."The Creation of Art..." The moment of creation, the birth of a new world. The moment when the future is born, the moment when the past is consumed.

More important, any approach to painting which appears to ignore the present possibilities of Man's development and the potentialities of the human mind. The present day is not a time to look backward, to mourn the loss of a world that can never be regained. The present day is a time of renewal, of new beginnings. It is a time of hope, of promise. It is the time when we can shape the future, when we can create a world of our own making.

"To be or not to be..." Hamlet's question is still unanswered, but his words have echoed through the ages, inspiring generations to come. His question is the question of our time, the question of our future. It is the question that will shape the course of history, the question that will determine the course of our lives.

"To be or not to be..." The choice is ours, the responsibility is ours. We must choose wisely, for the consequences of our actions will be felt for generations to come. We must choose to create, to innovate, to strive for progress. We must choose to be, to live, to dream big.

Whimsies and Modernism..."The Creation of Art..." The moment of creation, the birth of a new world. The moment when the future is born, the moment when the past is consumed. The moment when we can shape the future, when we can create a world of our own making. Whimsies and Modernism..."The Creation of Art..." The moment of creation, the birth of a new world. The moment when the future is born, the moment when the past is consumed. The moment when we can shape the future, when we can create a world of our own making.
constructive goal: by defeating the semblance of a perfect order, they help secure the reality of the real. There is, it seems, a crack in the otherwise sealed system, a flaw in the social structure of repetition for which we might in the end be grateful. Borges continues: “the scribe who writes out a contract never fails to include some error; I myself, in this hurried statement, have misrepresented some splendor, some atrocity—perhaps, too, some mysterious monotony.” 21

I take this passage and others like it as evidence of a peculiarly Borgesian way of marking difference through a process of self-reflection that asks us to go beyond the claim that modernist literature is condemned to practice mimesis as mere repetition. On such occasions, the articulation of the significant difference that “makes it new” comes about through what Adorno might call the process of a “second reflection” on the place of mimesis within a socially conditioned framework of repetition. In contrast to mere repetition, “second reflection” allows the work of art to assert its claim to be something more or other than a mimesis of the world, in part by reflecting on the impossibility of it ever being a full and complete mimesis of the world. “Second reflection” grants art its autonomy; it acknowledges the status of art as not just as like the world it resembles but as definitively unlike it. There is a passage from Novalis that Borges cites in the essay “Avatars of the Tortoise” that makes the point in a compelling way—by suggesting that the imperfections in the work of artistic “creation” ensure the artwork’s claim to truth: “The greatest wizard would be the one who could bewitch himself to the point of taking his own phantasmagorical creations as autonomous apparitions. Would that not be our case? I conjecture that it is so. We (that is, the undivided divinity that is at work in us) have dreamed a world. We have dreamed it resistant, mysterious, visible, ubiquitous in space and fixed in time; but we have consented to the presence of tenuous and eternal interstices of irrationality in its architecture in order to know that it is false.” 22 This admission is the paradoxical key to a discovery of the artwork’s claim to truth. The “flaws” that prove it false, like the extraneous elements that intervene in the perfectly administered society, are imperfections that suggest how art remembers what it was like to be a world, and not just to be like the world.

ADORNO: “Art is actually the world once over, as like it as is unlike it.” 23

BORGES: “Mirrors and copulation are abominable, for they multiply the number of mankind.” 24

Borges is himself so subtle and compelling on such points that rather than turn further to someone like Adorno or Benjamin for elucidation of the relations of mimesis, repetition, and difference, I want to proceed by reconstructing what I think of as the archaeology of their relations using some of Borges’s own texts for the purpose. Said in other terms, I think that Borges himself provides models for the process out of which his distinctive mode of fiction-making emerges. This is, admittedly, a speculative or mythopoetic account that involves a reflection upon origins—speculative because such origins are accessible only through the powers of memory and desire, as the counterfactual, fictional, or “fantastic” image of conditions that would be ungraspable in a more disenchanted world. But it is nonetheless a Borgesian account, and so consistent with the material under scrutiny. It begins from Borges’s interest in certain archaic forms of mimesis that are related to what I call “fabulation” and it proceeds from there to include various forms of reflection—both literary and philosophical—on the fate of art as both like the world and categorically unlike it. It leads to some of the distinctively Borgesian ways of marking the transformation from mimesis to repetition and then of articulating difference within repetition, of which we have already seen some examples.

Fabulation: this Borgesian version of what Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment speculatively called the moment of “myth” provides a point of reference for the reconstruction of what Benjamin described as the power of the “mimetic faculty” in art. Unlike certain forms of philosophy, which give us notional worlds, fabulation is mimetic in the more archaic and potentially powerful sense. It works by nonsensous similarities rather than by conceptual representations. Unlike other forms of world-making (architecture and building, for example), or creature-fashioning (the kind involving sex and childbirth), fabulation dreams of creation at a safe and clean distance, without sweat or labor; it would proceed purely, exactly, and absolutely. Correspondence and sympathy are its archaic modes, a familiarity with which Borges draws from James Frazer’s Golden Bough, although it could just as well have been from Benjamin’s essay “On the Mimetic Faculty.” 25 For instance, Borges suggests that sympathy “postulates an unavoidable link between different things, either because its figure is the same—imitative magic, homeopathy—or because of some previous contiguity—contagious magic. An illustration of the second was the curative ointment of Kenelm Digby, which was applied not to the bandaged wound, but rather to the guilty steel that inflicted it—while the wound, without the rigor of barbarous cures, was forming a scar. . . . The redskin Indians of Nebraska dressed up in bison skins . . . and danced wildly on the desert day and night to make the bison arrive.” 26 Mimesis in this archaic form has the power to establish connections remotely, as in certain instances of superstition and magic: “For the superstitious person, there is a necessary connection not just between a bullet and a dead person, but between a dead person and a tortured effigy of wax or the prophetic breaking of a mirror or the salt that one throws over the shoulder.” 27 The subtlety of Borges’s development of this point—easily the
voy. Gradualmente, lo fué acostumbrando a la realidad. Una vez le ordenó que embanderara una cumbre lejana. Al otro día, flameaba la bandera en la cumbre. Ensayó otros experimentos análogos, cada vez más audaces. Comprendió con cierta amargura que su hijo estaba listo para nacer—y tal vez impaciente. Esa noche lo besó por primera vez y lo envió al otro templo cuyos despojos blanquean río abajo, a muchas leguas de inextricable selva y de ciénaga. Antes (para que no supiera nunca que era un fantasma, para que se creyera un hombre como los otros) le infundió el olvido total de sus años de aprendizaje. (F, p. 64)

There is more than just a trace of the Prometheus desire to appropriate cosmic creative energies in a passage such as this. But there is also a purposeful weakness in the Borgesian version of creation, a flaw in the mimetic pattern that in turn confers a semblance of consciousness upon it. It seems that Borges's dreamer cannot himself endure the complete repression of origins that he imagines or wishes for his creature. The dreamer may well be able to conceal the contingency of existence from his creature, but he cannot repress the fact that his own existence may be feigned. He is himself rather stunned and humiliated by this possibility: "To be not a man, but the projection of another man's dream—what incomparable humiliation, what vertigo! Every parent feels concern for the children he has procreated (or allowed to be procreated) in happiness or in mere confusion" (CF, p. 100). "With relief, with humiliation, with terror, he realized that he, too, was but appearance, that another man was dreaming him" (CF, p. 100). 32 With this admission comes the awareness that mimesis has an edge or a fold at the very core of its creation. (Think of all the seam-like scars that mark the body of the monster in the 1994 Kenneth Branagh film, Mary Shelley's <i>Frankenstein</i>.) With it, Borges opens the door to a panoply of further reflections on the problem of mimesis and/as repetition. 33

Always, the question "why" is prominent in Borges's thinking: not just why such resemblances should be imperfect, but why the conditions giving rise to them should affect us so. In a text entitled "Partial Enchantments of the <i>Quixote</i>," published in <i>Otras inquisiciones</i>, Borges asks: "Why does it make us uneasy to know that the map is within the map and the thousand and one nights within the book of <i>A Thousand and One Nights</i>?" And also "Why does it disquiet us to know that Don Quixote is a reader of the <i>Quixote</i>, and Hamlet is a spectator of <i>Hamlet</i>?" He offers a speculative response that most readers would recognize as the source of a constant preoccupation in his texts: such inferences suggest that if the characters in a story can be readers or spectators, then we, their readers or spectators, may likewise be fictitious.

Borges shares Nietzsche's suspicion that "philosophy" may have its origins not in wonder but in anxiety, in the desire to quiet the fear that comes from this abandonment of reality's metaphysical grounds. And because Borges also shares the view that there may be no final quieting of this anxiety, no reducing the basic contingency of the world, he is inclined to regard philosophical discourse as a series of puzzles to be enjoyed, in their multifarious versions and inversions, rather than as presenting definitive solutions to problems. Indeed, what often is recognized as "philosophy" within Borges's texts frequently takes the form of "baroque" reflections on the embedding of worlds within worlds, or the doubling of the self. Philosophy in this "baroque" guise reveals in the enigma. It takes an intellectual, bookish, even literary delight in the paradox. Here we think of such Borges texts as "New Refutation of Time," "Avatars of the Tortoise," or "The Next-to-Last Version of Reality." In "An Examination of the Work of Herbert Quain" Borges comments on a book purportedly entitled <i>April March</i>. It is said to have all the features of games—among them "symmetry, arbitrary rules, tedium." 34 As yet another kind of game, philosophy helps relieve the boredom of a world ruled by repetition. A short passage from the important and elaborate story "Tiôn, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" captures the point especially well: "The fact that every philosophy is by definition a dialectical game, a <i>Philosophie des Als Ob</i>, has allowed them to proliferate. There are systems upon systems that are incredible but possessed of a pleasing architecture or a certain agreeable sensationalism. The metaphysicians of Tiôn seek not truth, or even plausibility—they seek to amaze, astound. In their view, metaphysics is a branch of the literature of fantasy." 35 Why? The answer lies in the suggestion that the world may itself be the product of an aberrant mimesis. "Tiôn, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" attributes the origins of a fantastical world, Uqbar, to "the conjunction of a mirror and an encyclopedia" (CF, p. 68). The encyclopedic Enlightenment project may be every bit as exhausted in Borges as it is in Flaubert, and yet here it becomes the source of a new productivity. The terror it produces is worthy of special remark ("mirrors and copulation are abominable").

In the "mimetic" universe of doubled worlds, the heated debates among philosophers, all ostensibly in search of some final truth, become rather like rhetorical "points" in a process of argumentation that never ceases to unfold, ultimately substituting its discursive folds for the world it attempts to fathom. 36 We think of Borges's observation that in the land of Tiôn "century upon century of idealism could hardly have failed to influence reality," 37 As for Uqbar, it is a place where entire schools of thought collide and conflict, although always inconclusively. One school of thought denies time whereas another declares that everything has already taken place and that our lives are but repetitions of the past; some theorists propose that the history of the universe was written by a demiurge, whose secret script we must seek to decipher, whereas others gesture toward a different secret: that each person's existence is doubled by someone living on the other side of the earth. More-
A diferencia de Newton y de Schopenhauer, sus antecesores no creen en un tiempo uniforme absoluto. Crean en innumerables series de tiempos, en una red de tiempos convergentes y paralelos. En esta red, los tiempos se cruzan y se entrecruzan, creando una verdadera multiverso.

En este contexto, la idea de la repetición como fenómeno fundamental adquiere un nuevo significado. Lo que antes parecía una simple reflejo en el pasado, se convierte en un espejo que refleja el presente y el futuro. En este modelo, cada instante es una repetición de sucesos anteriores, pero con un giro, un desvío, un cambio.

Por otro lado, en la filosofía de los momentos fantásticos, se presenta una visión del mundo que desafía la noción clásica de linealidad del tiempo. Sin embargo, no es una revolución completa, sino más bien un complemento, un enriquecimiento que añade un nuevo nivel de interpretación a la realidad.

En este sentido, el tiempo se convierte en un espacio multiforme, donde las posibilidades infinitas se entrelazan y se críptan en el mar de los posibles. Como en un laberinto, cada decisión, cada acción, es un paso hacia una realidad diferente, hacia una historia alternativa.

Y es precisamente en este entrelazamiento de realidades que radica el poder de la fantasía. En la fantasía, el tiempo es un misterio que se desvanece en el momento en que se intenta entenderlo. Es un espejo que se vuelve en su propia imagen, un modelo que se simple en su propia perfección.

En conclusión, la idea de la repetición en el tiempo, no como un ciclo sin fin, sino como un espejo que refleja el mundo en su totalidad, es una noción que enriquece nuestra comprensión del tiempo y de la realidad. Es una idea que nos invita a mirar hacia el pasado, hacia el presente y hacia el futuro con un nuevo sentido, con un nuevo interés, con un nuevo respeto.

Y es en este sentido, que la fantasía, con su visión del tiempo, nos ofrece una perspectiva única y fascinante de la realidad.
and finds solutions consistent with the philosophical work of figures whose names could well have been more prominent in the foregoing remarks. His work meets Adorno's description of art all too well. As Adorno writes in the passage from *Aesthetic Theory* cited in one of the epigraphs above, “art is actually the world once over, as like it as is unlike it” (*AT*, p. 336). I think that Borges proves the point.

**Notes**

4. The project is consistent with the view sketched by William Irwin in “Philosophy and the Philosophical, Literature and the Literary, Borges and the Labyrinthine,” in this volume.
6. In “Philosophy and the Philosophical, Literature and the Literary, Borges and the Labyrinthine” William Irwin (this volume) describes this as a “secondary meaning” of the word “literature,” but I would argue that it has become secondary; it remains prior, if not primary, in the historical sense.
7. Throughout all this Flaubert displays a discernible sympathy toward his heroes, and thus introduces a mode of articulation that the rhetoric of repetition would not of itself allow. I would suggest that sympathy may be regarded as a form of mimesis concentrated in, or displaced to, the affective domain.
12. *CF*, p. 135: “Pudía reconstruir los sueños, todos los entusiasmos. Dos o tres veces había reconstruido un día entero... Me dijo: Más recuerdas tengo yo sólo que los que habrían tenido todos los hombres desde que el mundo es mundo” (*F*, p. 123).
15. Cf. The character Herzl Ashe in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Terríus,” who dies from an aneurism (*F*, p. 21). In Funes’ case, the name suggests remembrance and death (funereal), and also that which goes up in smoke (*bume*). On matters relevant to the erasure of character in Borges, see Sylvia Molloy, *Las Letras de Borges* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1979).
17. As for the Argentine literary tradition itself, Borges addresses the matter in an essay published in *Discurso* (“El escritor argentino y la tradición”).
18. *CF*, p. 101. “Como todos los hombres de Babilonia, he sido proconsl; como todos, esclavo; también he conocido la omnipotencia, el oprobio, las cárcel. Miren: a mi mano derecha le falta el indice. Miren: por este desgarro de la capa se ve en mi estómago un tatuaje bermejo” [*F*, p. 67 (emphasis added)].
19. *CF*, p. 70. “En vida padeció de irrealidad, como tantos ingleses; muerto, no es ni siquiera el fantasma que ya era entonces” (*F*, p. 17).
20. *CF*, p. 105. “El comprador de una docena de anforas de vino damasceno no se maravillará si de una ellas encierra un talismán o una víbora” (*F*, p. 74).
25. “Ese procedimiento o ambición de los antiguos hombres ha sido sujetado por Frazer a una conveniente ley general, la de la simpatía, que postula un vínculo inevitable entre cosas distantes, ya porque su figura es igual—magia imitativa, homeopática—ya por el hecho de una cercanía anterior—magia contagiosa. Ilustración de la segunda era el ungüento curativo de Kenelm Digby, que se aplicaba no a la vendada herida, sino al acero delincuente que la infirió—mientras aquella, sin el rigor de bárbaras curaciones, iba cicatrizando. De la primera eran los ejemplos son infinitos. Los pieles rojos de Nebraska revestían cueros crujeñes de bisonte... y machacaban días y noche sobre el desierto un balfe tormentoso, para que los bisontes llegaran” (*D*, pp. 88–89).
26. “Para el superintelectual, hay una necesaria conexión no sólo entre un balazo y un muerto, sino entre un muerto y una maltratada efigie de cera o la rotura profética de un espejo o la sal que se vuelca o trece comensales terribles” (*D*, 89).
27. “La magia es la coronación o pesadilla de lo casual, no su contradicción. El milagro no es menos forastero en ese universo que en el de los astrónomos. Todas las leyes naturales lo rigen, y otras imaginarias” (*D*, p. 89).
28. “Ese recelo de que un hecho temible puede ser atraído por su mención, es imperioso en el nuevo mito del esfuerzo real, mítico en una novela, que debe ser un juego preciso de vigilancias, ecos y afinidades. Todo episodio, en un cuidadoso relato, es de proyección ulterior” (*D*, p. 90).
29. *CF*, p. 97. “Quería soñar un hombre... con integridad minuciosa e imponerlo en la realidad” (*F*, p. 60).
31. CP, pp. 97-98. "El proyecto mágico había agotado el espíritu de la ciencia nueva, que, si alguna vez existió, ha desaparecido. Las ideas de la ciencia nueva, en este caso, son: la centralidad, la inercia, la causalidad, la estabilidad, la uniformidad, la precisión, la experimentabilidad, la generalización..."

32. No se puede tratar de una mera imitación de forma, sino que se trata de una imitación de contenido..."

33. En el contexto de la ciencia moderna, la reacción a la idea de la ciencia nueva es la misma que la reacción a la idea de la ciencia antigua: la centralidad, la inercia, la causalidad, la estabilidad, la uniformidad, la precisión, la experimentabilidad, la generalización...

34. "La centralidad, la inercia, la causalidad, la estabilidad, la uniformidad, la precisión, la experimentabilidad, la generalización..."

35. "La centralidad, la inercia, la causalidad, la estabilidad, la uniformidad, la precisión, la experimentabilidad, la generalización..."

36. "La centralidad, la inercia, la causalidad, la estabilidad, la uniformidad, la precisión, la experimentabilidad, la generalización..."

37. "La centralidad, la inercia, la causalidad, la estabilidad, la uniformidad, la precisión, la experimentabilidad, la generalización..."

38. "La centralidad, la inercia, la causalidad, la estabilidad, la uniformidad, la precisión, la experimentabilidad, la generalización..."

39. "La centralidad, la inercia, la causalidad, la estabilidad, la uniformidad, la precisión, la experimentabilidad, la generalización..."

40. "La centralidad, la inercia, la causalidad, la estabilidad, la uniformidad, la precisión, la experimentabilidad, la generalización..."

41. "La centralidad, la inercia, la causalidad, la estabilidad, la uniformidad, la precisión, la experimentabilidad, la generalización..."

42. "La centralidad, la inercia, la causalidad, la estabilidad, la uniformidad, la precisión, la experimentabilidad, la generalización..."