Las páginas que siguen presentan ciertos textos filosóficos de autores mencionados en “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”, esperando que su yuxtaposición y la vecindad con los estudios que preceden produzcan nuevos efectos de sentido.

Los fragmentos transcriptos son los siguientes:

- De George Berkeley, dos textos esenciales en torno al esse est percipi; el primero, de la primera parte del Treatise, y el segundo, del tercer Diálogo entre Hylas y Philonous.

- De David Hume, un pasaje de Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding, que ofrece el contexto en el que aparece la frase citada en “Tlön” “Hume notó para siempre que los argumentos de Berkeley no admiten la menor réplica y no causan la menor convicción”.

- De Bertrand Russell, la página 119 de su libro The Analysis of Mind mencionada en la siguiente nota de “Tlön”: “Russell (The Analysis of Mind, 1921, página 159) supone que el planeta ha sido creado hace pocos minutos, provisto de una humanidad que ‘se acuerda’ un pasado ilusorio”.

- De Alexius Meinong, la traducción al inglés de un artículo en el que el autor resume su teoría a propósito de lo que en “Tlön” figura como “el mundo subsistente de Meinong”.

1. GEORGE BERKELEY


I. It is evident to any one who takes a Survey of the Objects of Humane Knowledge, that they are either Ideas actually imprinted on the Senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the Passions and Operations of the Mind, or lastly Ideas formed by help of Memory and Imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By Sight I have the Ideas of Light and Colours with their several Degrees and Variations. By Touch I perceive, for Example, Hard and Soft, Heat and Cold, Motion and Resistance, and of all these more and less either as to Quantity or Degree. Smelling furnishes me with Odors; the Palate with Tastes, and Hearing conveys Sounds to the Mind in all their variety of Tone and Composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one Name, and so to be reputed as one Thing. Thus, for Example, a certain Colour, Taste, Smell, Figure and Consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct Thing, signified by the Name *Apple*. Other collections of Ideas constitute a Stone, a Tree, a Book, and the like sensible Things; which, as they are pleasing or disagreeable, excite the Passions of Love, Hatred, Joy, Grief, and so forth.

II. But besides all that endless variety of Ideas or Objects of Knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers Operations, as Willing, Imagining, Remembering about them. This perceiving, active Being is what I call *Mind, Spirit, Soul* or *my Self*. By which Words I do not denote any one of my Ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived; for the Existence of an Idea consists in being perceived.

III. That neither our Thoughts, nor Passions, nor Ideas formed by the Imagination, exist without the Mind, is what every Body will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various Sensations or Ideas imprinted on the Sense, however blended or combined to-
gether (that is, whatever Objects they compose) cannot exist otherwise than in a Mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive Knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the Term *Exist* when applied to sensible Things. The Table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my Study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my Study I might perceive it, or that some other Spirit actually does perceive it. There was an Odor, that is, it was smelled; There was a Sound, that is to say, it was heard; a Colour or Figure, and it was perceived by Sight or Touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like Expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute Existence of unthinking Things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their *Esse* is *Percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any Existence, out of the Minds or thinking Things which perceive them.

IV. It is indeed an Opinion strangely prevailing amongst Men, that Houses, Mountains, Rivers, and in a word all sensible Objects have an Existence Natural or Real, distinct from their being perceived by the Understanding. But with how great an Assurance and Acquiescence soever this Principle may be entertained in the World; yet whoever shall find in his Heart to call it in Question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest Contradiction. For what are the forementioned Objects but the things we perceive by Sense, and what do we perceive besides our own Ideas or Sensations; and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any Combination of them should exist unperceived?


_Hyl._ I own my self satisfied in this point. But do you in earnest think, the real Existence of sensible things consists in their being actually perceived? If so; How comes it that all Mankind distinguish between them? Ask the first Man you meet, and he shall tell you, to be perceived is one thing, and to exist is another.

_Phil._ I am content, _Hylas_, to appeal to the common Sense of the World for the Truth of my Notion. Ask the Gardiner, why he thinks
yonder Cherry-Tree exists in the Garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his Senses. Ask him, why he thinks an Orange-Tree not to be there, and he shall tell you, because he does not perceive it. What he perceives by Sense, that he terms a real Being, and saith it is, or exists; but that which is not perceivable, the same, he saith, hath no Being.

_Hyl._ Yes, _Philonous_, I grant the Existence of a sensible thing consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.

_Phil._ And what is perceivable but an Idea? And can an Idea exist without being actually perceived? These are Points long since agreed between us.

_Hyl._ But be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny it is shocking, and contrary to the common Sense of Men. Ask the Fellow, whether yonder Tree hath an Existence out of his Mind: What Answer think you he would make?

_Phil._ The same that I would myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of his Mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the real Tree existing without his Mind is truly known and comprehended by (that is, exists in) the infinite Mind of God. Probably he may not at first glance be aware of the direct and immediate Proof there is of this, inasmuch as the very Being of a Tree, or any other sensible Thing, implies a Mind wherein it is. But the Point itself he cannot deny. The Question between the Materialists and me is not, whether Things have a real Existence out of the Mind of this or that Person, but whether they have an absolute Existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all Minds. This indeed some Heathens and Philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains Notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy Scriptures, will be of another Opinion. (…)

_Phil._ Strictly speaking, _Hylas_, we do not see the same Object that we feel; neither is the same Object perceived by the Microscope, which was by the naked Eye. But in case every Variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new Kind or Individual, the endless Number or Confusion of Names would render Language impracticable. Therefore to avoid this as well as other Inconveniences which are obvious upon a little Thought, Men combine together several Ideas, apprehended by divers Senses, or by the same Sense
at different times, or in different Circumstances, but observed however to have some Connexion in Nature, either with respect to Coexistence or Succession; all which they refer to one Name, and consider as one Thing. Hence it follows that when I examine by my other Senses a Thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better the same Object which I had perceived by Sight, the Object of one Sense not being perceived by the other Senses. And when I look through a Microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived already with my bare Eyes, the Object perceived by the Glass being quite different from the former. But in both cases my Aim is only to know what Ideas are connected together; and the more a Man knows of the Connexion of Ideas, the more he is said to know of the Nature of Things. What therefore if our Ideas are variable; what if our Senses are not in all Circumstances affected with the same Appearances? It will not thence follow, they are not to be trusted, or that they are inconsistent either with themselves or any thing else, except it be with your preconceived Notion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, inperceivable, real Nature, marked by each Name: Which Prejudice seems to have taken its Rise from not rightly understanding the common Language of Men speaking of several distinct Ideas, as united into one thing by the Mind. And indeed there is Cause to suspect several erroneous Conceits of the Philosophers are owing to the same Original: While they began to build their Schemes, not so much on Notions as Words, which were framed by the Vulgar, merely for Conveniency and Dispatch in the common Actions of Life, without any regard to Speculation.

2. Hume


[122] There is another sceptical topic of a like nature, derived from the most profound philosophy; which might merit our attention, were it requisite to dive so deep, in order to discover arguments and reasonings, which can so little serve to any serious pur-
pose. It is universally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the sensible qualities of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c. are merely secondary, and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype or model, which they represent. If this be allowed, with regard to secondary qualities, it must also follow, with regard to the supposed primary qualities of extension and solidity; nor can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former. The idea of extension is entirely acquired from the senses of sight and feeling: and if all the qualities, perceived by the senses, be in the mind, not in the object, the same conclusion must reach the idea of extension, which is wholly dependent on the sensible ideas or the ideas of secondary qualities. Nothing can save us from this conclusion, but the asserting, that the ideas of those primary qualities are attained by Abstraction, an opinion, which, if we examine it accurately, we shall find to be unintelligible, and even absurd. An extension, that is neither tangible nor visible, cannot possibly be conceived: and a tangible or visible extension, (p.155) which is neither hard nor soft, black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of human conception. Let any man try to conceive a triangle in general, which is neither Isosceles nor Scalenum, nor has any particular length or proportion of sides; and he will soon perceive the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas.

[123] Thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this, that such an opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and if referred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct, and at the

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1 This argument is drawn from Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism, which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted. He professes, however, in his title-page (and undoubtedly with great truth) to have composed his book against the sceptics as well as against the atheists and free-thinkers. But that all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism.
same time carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial enquirer. The second objection goes farther, and represents this opinion as contrary to reason: at least, if it be a principle of reason, that all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the object. Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable *something*, as the cause of our perceptions; a notion so imperfect, that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it.

3. Bertrand Russell


One reason for treating memory at this early stage is that it seems to be involved in the fact that images are recognized as “copies” of past sensible experience. In the preceding lecture I alluded to Hume's principle “that all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.” Whether or not this principle is liable to exceptions, everyone would agree that is has a broad measure of truth, though the word “exactly” might seem an overstatement, and it might seem more correct to say that ideas *approximately* represent impressions. Such modifications of Hume's principle, however, do not affect the problem which I wish to present for your consideration, namely: Why do we believe that images are, sometimes or always, approximately or exactly, copies of sensations? What sort of evidence is there? And what sort of evidence is logically possible? The difficulty of this question arises through the fact that the sensation which an image is supposed to copy is in the past when the image exists, and can therefore only be known by memory, while, on the other hand, memory of past sensations seems only possible by means of present images. How, then, are we to find any way of comparing the present image and the past sensation? The problem is just as acute if we say that images differ from their prototypes as if
we say that they resemble them; it is the very possibility of comparison that is hard to understand.\textsuperscript{2} We think we can know that they are alike or different, but we cannot bring them together in one experience and compare them. To deal with this problem, we must have a theory of memory. In this way the whole status of images as “copies” is bound up with the analysis of memory.

In investigating memory-beliefs, there are certain points which must be borne in mind. In the first place, everything constituting a memory-belief is happening now, not in that past time to which the belief is said to refer. It is not logically necessary to the existence of a memory-belief that the event remembered should have occurred, or even that the past should have existed at all. There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that “remembered” a wholly unreal past. There is no logically necessary connection between events at different times; therefore nothing that is happening now or will happen in the future can disprove the hypothesis that the world began five minutes ago. Hence the occurrences which are called knowledge of the past are logically independent of the past; they are wholly analysable into present contents, which might, theoretically, be just what they are even if no past had existed.

I am not suggesting that the non-existence of the past should be entertained as a serious hypothesis. Like all sceptical hypotheses, it is logically tenable, but uninteresting. All that I am doing is to use its logical tenability as a help in the analysis of what occurs when we remember.

\textsuperscript{2} How, for example, can we obtain such knowledge as the following: “If we look at, say, a red nose and perceive it, and after a little while \textit{ekphore}, its memory-image, we note immediately how unlike, in its likeness, this memory-image is to the original perception” (A. Wohlgemuth, “On the Feelings and their Neural Correlate with an Examination of the Nature of Pain,” Journal of Psychology, vol. viii, part iv, June, 1917).
4. ALEXIUS MEINONG


I. We must turn, in the first place, to a philosophical discipline which is not as yet part of the tradition, which is therefore in a certain sense new, and about which I have said some things which were intended to be of a fundamental nature. To begin with, it is impossible to give a regular definition of entity [Gegenstand]; for genus and differentia are lacking, since everything is an entity. However, the etymology of the word ‘gegenstehen’ yields at least an indirect characteristic, since it points to the experiences which apprehend entities; but these experiences must not be thought of as somehow constituting the entities. Every inner experience, at least every sufficiently elementary one, has such an entity; and insofar as the experience finds an expression - hence first of all in the words and sentences of language - this expression has a meaning [Bedeutung], and this meaning is always an entity. All knowledge, too, deals therefore with entities.

But large and important groups of entities have found no home in the traditional sciences; these sciences, moreover, are for the most part exclusively concerned with a knowledge of reality [Wirklichen], while even unreal things with being, things without being, possibilities, and even impossibilities can be objects of knowledge, namely, of a knowledge which is of interest to the as yet theoretically naive person only, as it were, when it promises to serve as a means for knowledge of reality. In contrast to such a preference for reality, which, in fact, has been overcome so far in no science, there exists the obvious need for a science which deals with entities without any restriction, especially without restriction to the special case of existence, so that it can be called existence-free [daseinsfrei]. This science about entities as such, or about pure entities, I have called the theory of entities.
Much of what belongs to this theory has already been studied under the title ‘Logic’ (especially: ‘Pure Logic’); and that modern mathematical logic belongs completely to the realm of the theory of entities is only concealed by its goal of being a calculus, which seems to favor an extensive externalization [Veräusserlichung] in the sense of the logic of extensions, while it is just a complete internalization [Verinnerlichung] which the theory of entities strives for and makes possible. People have dealt with topics from the [p. 224/225] theory of entities since antiquity under the heading of ‘Metaphysics,’ and, especially, under the heading of ‘Ontology’ as a part of metaphysics; and they have not always failed to recognize the characteristic feature of freedom from existence. But as a goal in itself, the concept of a theory of what is free from existence has, so far as I can see, never been espoused. According to this concept, there belongs to the theory of entities everything that can be made out about entities irrespective of their existence (for example, whatever it is that holds for the class of all colors which make up the ‘color space,’ as distinguished from the ‘color body’ which is restricted to the psychologically given); hence, everything that is a matter of a priori knowledge, so that the a priori can be treated as a defining characteristic of the kind of knowledge of which the theory of entities consists.

What belongs to the theory of entities is thus what is rational. Insofar [as it is that], it is therefore anything but a newly discovered country, but rather, in regard to one of its most important parts, mathematics, the justly admired standard of scientific precision. What is new is, perhaps, an insight into the peculiarity of this country and into the nature of its boundaries -unless one should rather speak of its boundlessness. In this respect, it is a kind of companion piece to metaphysics which tries to comprehend the totality of reality, while the theory of entities, because of its freedom from existence, tries to encompass also everything that is not real. Naturally, this freedom from existence does not mean that entities as such cannot have existence in the true sense. The fact that the kind of consideration and knowledge peculiar to the theory of entities therefore also appears where it can be applied to existents, constitutes one of the main values of the postulation of the new science.
Just as the concept of an entity in general is to be determined, at least *cum grano salis*, with an eye on *apprehension*, so are the main groups of entities characterized in regard to the main groups of apprehending experiences; and apprehensions are, as mentioned, all elementary experiences. Corresponding to the four main groups of the latter - to presentation [*Vorstellen*], thought [*Denken*], emotion [*Fühlen*], and desire [*Begehren*] - there are, therefore, four main groups of entities: objects [*Objekte*], objectives [*Objektive*], dignitatives [*Dignitative*], and desideratives [*Desiderative*]. However, the characteristics of the latter are not derived from the characteristics of the apprehending experiences. For this reason, nothing stands in the way of assigning to the immeasurable realm of objects, for example, also the inner experiences, even though these inner experiences cannot be given through presentations, but can only be apprehended through self-presentation or with the help of imagination.

II. Among these four groups of entities, the just mentioned first group, that of objects, allows us, because of its variety, accessibility, and hence familiarity, to ascertain some characteristic contrasts, which can then also be extended to the other groups of entities. Above all, there are entities which are built, as it were, upon other entities and which, therefore, have to be called *entities of higher order* [*Gegenstände höherer Ordnung*] as compared with those entities of lower order on which they are based. For example, the relation of difference is a *superius* [*Superius*] relative to what is different, [p. 225/226] the respective *inferiorea* [*Inférioren*]; similarly, the melody relative to the individual tones of which it is composed. In the first case, one deals with a *relat* [*Relat*] (one usually says, including an objective, ‘relation’ [*Relation*]); in the second case, with a complex [*Komplex*] (one says often, in analogy to ‘relation’, ‘complexion’ [*Komplexion*]). *Superiorea* are always *inferiorea* for even higher *superiorea*. These *ordered series* [*Ordnungsreihen*] are always open at the top. However, in the opposite direction, they must always lead to *infima* [*Infima*]. A relat which is based exclusively on other relats and, equally, a multitude [*Mehrheit*] which consisted only of multitudes, would form a faulty infinite series (the principle of the obligatory *infima*). The infinite divisibility of a straight line does not prove the contrary; for a straight line is not a multitude. Therefore, there can
be no relations without non-relational, and hence in this sense absolute, terms: an absolute relativism, as it is called, is impossible.

Furthermore, objects are such that their nature either allows them, as it were, to exist and to be perceived or prohibits it, so that, if they have being at all, this being cannot be existence, but only subsistence [Bestand] in a sense which has to be explained further. For example, it cannot be doubted that the difference between red and green has being, but this difference does not exist, it merely subsists. Similarly, the number of books in a library does not exist in addition to the books; the number of diagonals of a polygon exists, if that is possible, even less. But we must acknowledge, surely, that each of these numbers subsists. I have called such relats and complexes ideal relats and ideal complexes in contrast to real relats and real complexes; the latter can be perceived, for example, between color and place, and reveal themselves to be real by being perceived. In this way, what is perceivable shows itself to depend on perception: only by means of perception can one know, in the last analysis, that a thing of a certain color is located at this particular place, that a colored surface has this or that shape, that it is large or small, etc. By contrast, one cannot see the difference between red and green in the same way as these colors themselves; nor does one need perception, since one can infer from the very nature of red and green that they are different. Here the inferiora yield the superius in a way which can be known a priori; the ideal relat and ideal complex, respectively, is founded [fundiert] by its inferiora.

Finally, objects are either completely or incompletely determined or, for short, they are either complete or incomplete. Every real thing is such that any determination whatsoever either belongs to it or does not belong to it (according to the Principle of the Excluded Middle), while, for example, every conceptual object [Begriffsgegenstand], say, ‘the triangle,’ is such that infinitely many determinations (like being equilateral, having a right angle) it neither has nor does not have (hence, it does not fall under the Principle of the Excluded Middle). Entities of the latter kind, that is, incomplete entities, are, unless they contain an inner contradiction, undetermined also in regard to their being, as long as we are talking about being in the usual sense. On the other hand, there exist or subsist in some cases complete objects
which have such incomplete objects as determinations so that the latter are in this way ‘involved’ [implektiert] in the former. In regard to such [p. 226 /227] ‘involving objects’ [Implektenten], incomplete objects have under favorable circumstances pseudo-being [implexives Sein] or pseudo-so-being [implexives Sosein], respectively. The relationship between such entities on the one hand and Platonic ideas and universals on the other is unmistakable.

III. Objectives, whose peculiarity is reflected most directly by the fact that, under favorable circumstances, they do not only have being, but always also are being (in the wider sense) (R. Ameseder), are characterized, in contrast to all other entities, by the fact that they belong without exception to one of the two poles of the opposition between position [Position] and negation [Negation], which is completely unique and unbridgeable. What are called ‘negative objects,’ like non-smoker, uninvolved person, non-straight, etc., are not companion pieces to this contrast, but signify that an object is characterized by means of one pole of this contrast itself. Position and negation (not to be confused with affirmation and negation) is always a matter of the objective, but they have a part in the positum [Positum] and negatum [Negatum], which, as a rule, are objects. One must also avoid the misconception that non-being, because of its linguistic expression, is the negatum of the positum ‘being,’ which it is only in exceptional cases. As a rule, non-being is just as much a positum as being or, even more accurately (in case one wants to stress, by using the word ‘positum,’ the obligatory part which an explicitly taken position plays): ‘non-being’ is normally as positive as ‘being,’ namely, the counterpart [Widerspiel] which stands, so to speak, on the same level opposite to being.

If one takes the same point of view in regard to objectives which was advantageous above in regard to objects, then one recognizes that every objective is an ideal entity of higher order which, like an object, can be more or less determined. As in the case of objects, there are also ordered series of objectives, and these, too, are open at the top, while they are closed off at the bottom by an objective, in agreement with the law of the obligatory infima.

The much smaller qualitative diversity of objectives, compared with that of objects, allows us to make some survey of their kinds.
Being in the widest sense, which we encounter in every objective, is either being in the narrower sense (paradigm: ‘A is’), or so-being (‘A is B’), or conditional being [Mitsein] (‘If A, then B’). Traditional logic, which often speaks of ‘judgments’ when it means objectives, since it does not recognize objectives, and which, by the way, also speaks of concept instead of the entity which falls under the concept [Begriffsgegenstand], and which, in particular, often talks of ‘objects,’ this tradition distinguishes, accordingly, between the judgment of being (especially, the existential judgment), the categorical judgment, and the hypothetical judgment. That there is also a separate group of objectives corresponding to the disjunctive judgment appears dubious: one may surmise that the peculiarity of such judgments does not consist in a new kind of objective, but in special determinations of the complex of objectives which is always present in such cases, determinations which can also be present for objectives of so-being, conditional objectives, and even for objectives of being. The two groups of objectives with obligatory double inferiora, objectives of so-being and conditionals, show these inferiora as standing in characteristic relations: predicative connection for so-being, implication [Implikation] for conditionals. Implication occurs only between objectives, while predication is above all a matter of objects.

Being (in the narrower sense), as already mentioned, can be existence, but also subsistence: the sun exists, equality - and, similarly, any other ideal entity - cannot exist, but can only subsist. Existence itself, too, does not exist (and similarly, any other objective), but can only subsist. What exists, also subsists; what does not subsist, does not exist either. The difference between these two modes of being, which is in this way indirectly given, appears also when we compare them directly; and here, as little as in the case of ordinary empirical matters, should one object in principle against the legitimacy of appealing to ultimate data. But even what neither exists nor subsists, since it is prior to apprehension, has still a remnant of positional character [Positioncharakter], Aussersein, which, therefore, no entity seems to be lacking, with the exception, perhaps, of very special complicated cases.

So-being is either what-being [Wassein] (‘The horse is a mammal’) or how-being [Wiesein] (‘Snow is white’); expressions like ‘Birds
have wings’ and ‘The hare runs’ seem to be special cases of how-being. It is often advisable, when dealing with such objectives having two parts, to conjoin the second term of the material, the predicate, with the real core of the objective, while abstracting from the subject; hence to form, in regard to ‘A is B,’ the concept being-B. Such a ‘predicative’ [Prädikativ] can then, again, be attributed to the subject. Conditionals seem to divide into cases where the objectives which occur as inferiora stand in the ‘if’-relation and those where they stand in the ‘because’-relation. It has as yet not been investigated in what way the above mentioned contrast between pseudo-being and pseudo-non-being [ausserimplexivem Sein] affects the various modes of being here listed.

The peculiarity of being in the widest sense, that is, of objectives, manifests itself perhaps most radically in those determinations of it which have always been called ‘modal.’ Only the objective can, under favorable circumstances, be said to be factual; other entities, again, [can be said to be factual] at best through the objective, as it were. Factuality constitutes one end of a line of quantitatively variable data, the possibilities, the other end of which consists of the zero of possibility or unfactuality. Every greater possibility (including factuality) constitutes the ‘potius’ [Potius] for every smaller possibility (with the exception of zero possibility) as a ‘deterius’ [Deterius]. Every possibility coincides necessarily with the possibility of the opposite which completes it as a unit, if it does not have a potius above it, that is, in case it is a ‘main possibility’ [Hauptmöglichkeit]. Necessity, too, is a modal determination of some objectives; its nature seems at present to be describable only with the help of apprehension. It is not an increased factuality at all, but rather occurs even in connection with merely possible objectives.

IV. Objects and objectives are not the only basic groups of entities. It has turned out that there are at least two more basic groups which I have called ‘dignitatives’ and ‘desideratives.’ They are more closely related to objectives than to objects in that they, too, are by their very nature entities of higher [p. 228/229] order, based on objects or, on occasion, on objectives, and governed by the law of the obligatory infima. Moreover, each one of these groups is determined by an opposition which is peculiar to it, which is obviously analogous to the
opposition between position and negation, and which also cannot be reduced to an opposition between positum and negatum. To the dignitatives belongs the old triad: true (insofar as this is not exclusively a matter of apprehension), beautiful, and good - in addition, most likely, pleasant as well. Ought [Sollen] and purpose [Zweck] can be seen to be desideratives.